| 0/0 |
2026/11/18 05:03 |
flow |
assessment-kcsan |
30m
Results: map[Benign:true Explanation:### Race Summary
`ns_capable_common()` vs `posixtimer_get_target()` (inlined in
`posixtimer_send_sigqueue()`) on `current->flags` (`task_struct::flags`).
---
### Synchronization Context
Task 12250 running on CPU 0 in process context (`sys_acct` -> `capable()` ->
`ns_capable_common()`) updates its own process flags (`current->flags |=
PF_SUPERPRIV`) with local interrupts enabled and without holding a lock. While
executing this access, a local APIC timer interrupt fires on CPU 0. In hardirq
context, `posix_timer_fn()` invokes `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` ->
`posixtimer_get_target()`, which performs an unlocked check on the interrupted
task's flags (`current->flags & PF_EXITING`).
---
### Final Classification
**BENIGN**
---
### Reasoning
This data race is benign for the following reasons:
1. **Heuristic Hint:** The check `same_thread_group(t, current) &&
!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)` in `posixtimer_get_target()` is a heuristic
fast-path optimization. For non-PID-targeted timer signals, it prefers directing
signal delivery to the currently running task if it is part of the same process
group to avoid waking up an idle thread. If this check evaluates to false (or
sees an old value), signal delivery safely falls back to `t` (the group
leader/target task).
2. **Disjoint Flag Bits:** `ns_capable_common()` updates `PF_SUPERPRIV`
(`0x00000100`), whereas `posixtimer_get_target()` exclusively masks and tests
`PF_EXITING` (`0x00000004`). The bitwise OR operation in `ns_capable_common()`
does not affect the `PF_EXITING` bit.
3. **Lock Re-check:** If `current` is chosen as the delivery target,
`posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` immediately calls `lock_task_sighand(t, &flags)` to
acquire `t->sighand->siglock` and then re-verifies `task_can_queue_signal(t,
tmr->it_pid_type)` under the lock before enqueueing any signal.
4. **Naturally Aligned Word-Sized Access:** `task_struct::flags` is a naturally
aligned 32-bit unsigned integer (`unsigned int`). 32-bit aligned scalar memory
accesses are atomic with respect to interrupts and will not tear.
---
### Recommended Annotations
To silence KCSAN warnings on the lockless check, annotate the read in
`posixtimer_get_target()`:
```c
static inline struct task_struct *posixtimer_get_target(struct k_itimer *tmr)
{
struct task_struct *t = pid_task(tmr->it_pid, tmr->it_pid_type);
if (t && tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID &&
same_thread_group(t, current) && !(READ_ONCE(current->flags) &
PF_EXITING))
t = current;
return t;
}
``` FailureDetectableBy:]
|
| 1/1 |
2026/11/18 05:03 |
action |
kernel-checkouter |
0m
Results: map[KernelSrc:/app/workdir/cache/src/6d0c4d912ac4c28457116fbfe153047fb3052961/data]
|
| 2/1 |
2026/11/18 05:03 |
action |
kernel-builder |
0m
Results: map[KernelObj:/app/workdir/cache/build/4fc9cb093f0faa8b5951a9949e7cc5ff4ce76564/data]
|
| 3/1 |
2026/11/18 05:03 |
action |
codesearch-prepare |
0m
Results: map[Index:codesearch-index]
|
| 4/1 |
2026/11/18 05:03 |
agent |
expert |
30m
Model:
Results: map[Benign:true FailureDetectableBy:]
Instruction: # KCSAN Data Race Severity Analysis Protocol
You are an expert Linux kernel concurrency engineer analyzing a Kernel
Concurrency Sanitizer (KCSAN) data race report to determine if it is
**BENIGN** or **HARMFUL**.
## 1. CLASSIFICATIONS
### **BENIGN (Truly Benign)**
The logic is sound and structurally tolerant to compiler optimizations or
stale reads (or benign tearing on diagnostics/stats).
- **Diagnostics/Stats:** Reads or non-critical updates used only for `/proc`,
`/sys`, counters, timestamps, or `pr_info`.
- **Heuristic Hints:** A "hint" flag or threshold where an old value only
causes a slightly delayed update or a sub-optimal but safe fast-path.
- **Single-Writer Flag Updates:** A single writer updating flags where the
concurrent read is a simple bitwise check (e.g., `flags & MASK`). These are
historically tolerated, assuming neither "Fused Accesses" nor "Ordering
Violations" are relevant in this context.
- **Marked Reloads & Lock Re-checks:** A load feeding into a `cmpxchg()` loop,
checked against a later `READ_ONCE()` reload, or re-verified under a lock
(assuming no "Ordering Violations" on the lockless fast-path).
- **Safe Overwrites & Plain Scalar Accesses:** Writing the same value already
present, or aligned word-sized scalar accesses (e.g., `read (marked)` vs
plain `write`) where observing either the old or new value is safe.
### **HARMFUL (Logic Bug or Marking Required)**
The race causes incorrect behavior due to a synchronization failure or
because missing annotations allow the compiler or CPU to break the algorithm.
**Marking Required for Correctness:**
Do **not** classify a race as HARMFUL merely because an access lacks
`READ_ONCE()`/`WRITE_ONCE()`; you must prove one of these concrete hazards:
- **Fused Accesses:** The compiler hoists a plain load out of a tight
barrier-free spin loop causing a livelock (note: non-inlined calls,
`schedule()`, and locks act as compiler barriers), or reloads a pointer/index
between check and use (TOCTOU).
- **Torn Accesses:** An access larger than word size (e.g., 64-bit on 32-bit
arch, or multi-word structs; aligned `<= sizeof(long)` scalars and pointers
do not tear) is split into multiple non-atomic accesses. Note that
`READ_ONCE()` does **not** guarantee atomicity for 64-bit variables on 32-bit
architectures.
- **Ordering Violations:** The race breaks a required "happens-before"
relationship between dependent memory accesses (requires primitives with
implied or explicit memory barriers).
**Logic Bugs:**
A fundamental synchronization failure. Marking accesses will **not** fix it;
the logic itself must change.
- **Pointers/Lifecycle:** The racing variable is a pointer being dereferenced
or a refcount governing object lifecycle (Use-After-Free risk).
- **Control Flow:** The variable guards a critical section, memory allocation,
or hardware command.
- **Bitfields:** Concurrent writes to different bits in the same word.
Compilers often use non-atomic read-modify-write sequences, meaning a
write to `bit_A` can "clobber" a concurrent write to `bit_B`. However,
do not blindly assume all bitfield accesses are harmful; you must prove
that a concurrent write actually clobbers another in a way that breaks
logic.
- **Complex Structures:** Races on shared lists, trees, or hashmaps.
- **Lossy Updates:** Concurrent plain RMW operations (e.g., `var++`) on
non-diagnostic variables where every increment must be preserved.
- **State Machines:** Races allowing a state machine to bypass transitions
or enter an invalid state.
- **Adjacent Unsynchronized Operations:** Consider races happening at the
same time. For example, if both threads execute `struct->has_elements = true;
list_add(node, &struct->list);`, the race on `has_elements` implies an
adjacent race on `list_head`, which is HARMFUL.
## 2. RESEARCH & ANALYSIS WORKFLOW
1. **Locate the Race:** Find the exact variables and functions in the stack
traces. Do not speculate about hypothetical compiler
behaviors or theoretical dangers (e.g., dismissing something as
"fundamentally unsafe") without tracing the actual data flow to a crash.
2. **Contextualize:** Identify held locks, RCU sections, or interrupt
contexts. Explain why the race is possible (e.g., "Thread A holds `lock`,
but Thread B is a lockless reader").
3. **Data Flow:** Follow the racing variable into its subsequent uses. If
the reader sees a stale or torn value, what branch is taken? Does it lead
to a pointer dereference or `BUG_ON()`? **You must prove harm via this
data flow.**
4. **Failure Sequencing (if HARMFUL):** Construct a two-column execution trace
demonstrating the failure.
*Example format:*
```text
CPU0 CPU1
function_a()
// lockless read
ptr = global_ptr
<PREEMPT>
function_b()
lock(&my_lock)
global_ptr = NULL
unlock(&my_lock)
kfree(ptr)
if (ptr)
*ptr = 1; // -> Use-After-Free!
```
## 3. OUTPUT FORMAT
- **Race Summary:** `[Function A]` vs `[Function B]` on `[Variable/Field]`.
- **Synchronization context:** List held locks and explain the lack of mutual
exclusion.
- **Final Classification:** **BENIGN** or **HARMFUL**.
**If BENIGN:**
- **Reasoning:** Briefly explain why the race is structurally tolerant to stale
reads (or benign tearing on diagnostics/stats).
- **Recommended Annotations:** Suggest appropriate annotations (e.g.,
`READ_ONCE()`, `WRITE_ONCE()`, `data_race()`).
**If HARMFUL:**
- **Failure Reasoning:** Explain and provide a two-column interleaving showing
exactly how the race leads to a failure such as corruption or kernel crash.
- **FailureDetectableBy:** One of:
- `"kasan"`: memory safety bug (use-after-free, out-of-bounds, double-free).
- `"kmsan"`: uninitialized memory read/exposure (e.g. missing publish/subscribe ordering).
- `"any"`: kernel crash/hang (`BUG_ON`, `WARN_ON`, NULL deref, GPF, deadlock).
- `"user"`: user-visible ABI/semantic corruption detectable by userspace without a kernel crash.
- `"none"`: purely internal kernel state/accounting bug without crash or user-visible invariant violation.
- **Recommended Fix (ONLY if fix is trivial):** Suggest a structural fix (e.g.,
"Hold `mapping->i_pages` lock", "Convert to `atomic_t`") or required memory
ordering annotations (e.g., "Wrap in `READ_ONCE()`", "Use
`smp_load_acquire()`").
Don't make assumptions about the kernel source code (it may be different from what you assume it is).
Extensively use the provided code access tools (codesearch-*, git-*, grepper, etc)
to examine the actual source code, and confirm any assumptions.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt:
The data race report is:
==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in capable / posixtimer_send_sigqueue
read to 0xffff8881049be7ac of 4 bytes by interrupt on cpu 0:
posixtimer_get_target kernel/signal.c:2027 [inline]
posixtimer_send_sigqueue+0xd8/0x8d0 kernel/signal.c:2056
posix_timer_queue_signal kernel/time/posix-timers.c:365 [inline]
posix_timer_fn+0x93/0xc0 kernel/time/posix-timers.c:380
__run_hrtimer kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2079 [inline]
__hrtimer_run_queues+0x1f8/0x540 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2136
hrtimer_interrupt+0x27b/0x870 kernel/time/hrtimer.c:2255
local_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1051 [inline]
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x5f/0x1f0 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1068
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062 [inline]
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x6f/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/apic/apic.c:1062
asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:674
native_pause arch/x86/include/asm/vdso/processor.h:13 [inline]
delay_tsc+0x43/0xa0 arch/x86/lib/delay.c:76
udelay include/asm-generic/delay.h:64 [inline]
delay_access kernel/kcsan/core.c:332 [inline]
kcsan_setup_watchpoint+0x255/0x3f0 kernel/kcsan/core.c:622
ns_capable_common kernel/capability.c:343 [inline]
ns_capable kernel/capability.c:362 [inline]
capable+0x81/0xb0 kernel/capability.c:415
__do_sys_acct kernel/acct.c:297 [inline]
__se_sys_acct+0x2d/0x550 kernel/acct.c:293
__x64_sys_acct+0x1f/0x30 kernel/acct.c:293
x64_sys_call+0x1461/0x2550 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:164
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x11e/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
read-write to 0xffff8881049be7ac of 4 bytes by task 12250 on cpu 0:
ns_capable_common kernel/capability.c:343 [inline]
ns_capable kernel/capability.c:362 [inline]
capable+0x81/0xb0 kernel/capability.c:415
__do_sys_acct kernel/acct.c:297 [inline]
__se_sys_acct+0x2d/0x550 kernel/acct.c:293
__x64_sys_acct+0x1f/0x30 kernel/acct.c:293
x64_sys_call+0x1461/0x2550 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:164
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x11e/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 12250 Comm: syz.0.1758 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(lazy)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/06/2026
==================================================================
Reply: ### Race Summary
`ns_capable_common()` vs `posixtimer_get_target()` (inlined in `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()`) on `current->flags` (`task_struct::flags`).
---
### Synchronization Context
Task 12250 running on CPU 0 in process context (`sys_acct` -> `capable()` -> `ns_capable_common()`) updates its own process flags (`current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV`) with local interrupts enabled and without holding a lock. While executing this access, a local APIC timer interrupt fires on CPU 0. In hardirq context, `posix_timer_fn()` invokes `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` -> `posixtimer_get_target()`, which performs an unlocked check on the interrupted task's flags (`current->flags & PF_EXITING`).
---
### Final Classification
**BENIGN**
---
### Reasoning
This data race is benign for the following reasons:
1. **Heuristic Hint:** The check `same_thread_group(t, current) && !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)` in `posixtimer_get_target()` is a heuristic fast-path optimization. For non-PID-targeted timer signals, it prefers directing signal delivery to the currently running task if it is part of the same process group to avoid waking up an idle thread. If this check evaluates to false (or sees an old value), signal delivery safely falls back to `t` (the group leader/target task).
2. **Disjoint Flag Bits:** `ns_capable_common()` updates `PF_SUPERPRIV` (`0x00000100`), whereas `posixtimer_get_target()` exclusively masks and tests `PF_EXITING` (`0x00000004`). The bitwise OR operation in `ns_capable_common()` does not affect the `PF_EXITING` bit.
3. **Lock Re-check:** If `current` is chosen as the delivery target, `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` immediately calls `lock_task_sighand(t, &flags)` to acquire `t->sighand->siglock` and then re-verifies `task_can_queue_signal(t, tmr->it_pid_type)` under the lock before enqueueing any signal.
4. **Naturally Aligned Word-Sized Access:** `task_struct::flags` is a naturally aligned 32-bit unsigned integer (`unsigned int`). 32-bit aligned scalar memory accesses are atomic with respect to interrupts and will not tear.
---
### Recommended Annotations
To silence KCSAN warnings on the lockless check, annotate the read in `posixtimer_get_target()`:
```c
static inline struct task_struct *posixtimer_get_target(struct k_itimer *tmr)
{
struct task_struct *t = pid_task(tmr->it_pid, tmr->it_pid_type);
if (t && tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID &&
same_thread_group(t, current) && !(READ_ONCE(current->flags) & PF_EXITING))
t = current;
return t;
}
```
|
| 5/2 |
2026/11/18 05:03 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 7119
output: 33
thoughts: 398
Thoughts: **Data Race Analysis: Potential Interrupt Concurrency Issue**
Okay, so KCSAN's flagged a data race. My initial instinct is to dig in and understand the context. The report shows a read by an interrupt occurring on CPU 0: specifically, it's hitting `posixtimer_get_target` at kernel/signal.c:2027, eventually tracing back to `posix_timer_fn`. Simultaneously, there's a read-write operation performed by task 12250, also on CPU 0. The execution path for the read-write seems to be through `ns_capable_common`, ultimately reaching the `capable` function, in `kernel/capability.c` at line 415.
The crux of the issue is the address: `0xffff8881049be7ac` – looks like a 4-byte access. Crucially, *both* accesses are on the *same* CPU, CPU 0. It seems the interrupt is interrupting task 12250. This is suspicious. Looking at the callstack of task 12250, I see it's interrupted while in `delay_tsc` inside `kcsan_setup_watchpoint` within `capable` and then `ns_capable_common`.
The interrupt part is weird though. The interrupt interrupts task 12250. Is it the same context, and what data structure or variable is being accessed at `0xffff8881049be7ac`? I need to know.
To proceed, I need to look closely at the source code of both functions to understand the potential conflict. I need to inspect `ns_capable_common` around line 343 in `kernel/capability.c`, and `posixtimer_get_target` around line 2027 in `kernel/signal.c` to understand what the code is doing in this region to determine whether it is a false positive or not.
|
| 6/2 |
2026/11/18 05:04 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/capability.c FirstLine:320 LineCount:50]
Results: map[Contents: 320: * currently in effect to init_user_ns, false if not. Don't write an
321: * audit message for the check.
322: *
323: * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
324: */
325: bool has_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t, int cap)
326: {
327: return has_ns_capability_noaudit(t, &init_user_ns, cap);
328: }
329:
330: static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns,
331: int cap,
332: unsigned int opts)
333: {
334: int capable;
335:
336: if (unlikely(!cap_valid(cap))) {
337: pr_crit("capable() called with invalid cap=%u\n", cap);
338: BUG();
339: }
340:
341: capable = security_capable(current_cred(), ns, cap, opts);
342: if (capable == 0) {
343: current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
344: return true;
345: }
346: return false;
347: }
348:
349: /**
350: * ns_capable - Determine if the current task has a superior capability in effect
351: * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
352: * @cap: The capability to be tested for
353: *
354: * Return true if the current task has the given superior capability currently
355: * available for use, false if not.
356: *
357: * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
358: * assumption that it's about to be used.
359: */
360: bool ns_capable(struct user_namespace *ns, int cap)
361: {
362: return ns_capable_common(ns, cap, CAP_OPT_NONE);
363: }
364: EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
365:
366: /**
367: * ns_capable_noaudit - Determine if the current task has a superior capability
368: * (unaudited) in effect
369: * @ns: The usernamespace we want the capability in
]
|
| 7/2 |
2026/11/18 05:04 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 8705
output: 34
thoughts: 65
Thoughts: Here's my summary, as if I were thinking it:
**Digging into Privilege Levels**
Okay, so I'm looking at this bit of kernel code, specifically around line 343. I see that `current->flags` is being manipulated with `PF_SUPERPRIV`. Right, `current->flags` is an `unsigned int`, which in this architecture means 4 bytes. That sets up how the process operates.
Now, I need to understand the context. Let's see... I think the signal handling mechanisms might be relevant here. So let's jump over to `kernel/signal.c`, and I'll check around `posixtimer_get_target` at line 2027. This should give me some context, and let me get a better handle on the implications of the privilege modification, I need to know why.
|
| 8/2 |
2026/11/18 05:04 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/signal.c FirstLine:2010 LineCount:60]
Results: map[Contents:2010:
2011: /*
2012: * This function is used by POSIX timers to deliver a timer signal.
2013: * Where type is PIDTYPE_PID (such as for timers with SIGEV_THREAD_ID
2014: * set), the signal must be delivered to the specific thread (queues
2015: * into t->pending).
2016: *
2017: * Where type is not PIDTYPE_PID, signals must be delivered to the
2018: * process. In this case, prefer to deliver to current if it is in
2019: * the same thread group as the target process and its sighand is
2020: * stable, which avoids unnecessarily waking up a potentially idle task.
2021: */
2022: static inline struct task_struct *posixtimer_get_target(struct k_itimer *tmr)
2023: {
2024: struct task_struct *t = pid_task(tmr->it_pid, tmr->it_pid_type);
2025:
2026: if (t && tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID &&
2027: same_thread_group(t, current) && !(current->flags & PF_EXITING))
2028: t = current;
2029: return t;
2030: }
2031:
2032: /*
2033: * Find the target task for the POSIX timer signal and prevent that a
2034: * PIDTYPE_PID signal is queued on a task which has PF_EXITING set.
2035: */
2036: static inline struct task_struct *posixtimer_get_unignore_target(struct k_itimer *tmr)
2037: {
2038: struct task_struct *t = posixtimer_get_target(tmr);
2039:
2040: if (t && task_can_queue_signal(t, tmr->it_pid_type))
2041: return t;
2042:
2043: return NULL;
2044: }
2045:
2046: void posixtimer_send_sigqueue(struct k_itimer *tmr)
2047: {
2048: struct sigqueue *q = &tmr->sigq;
2049: int sig = q->info.si_signo;
2050: struct task_struct *t;
2051: unsigned long flags;
2052: int result;
2053:
2054: guard(rcu)();
2055:
2056: t = posixtimer_get_target(tmr);
2057: if (!t)
2058: return;
2059:
2060: if (!likely(lock_task_sighand(t, &flags)))
2061: return;
2062:
2063: if (!task_can_queue_signal(t, tmr->it_pid_type))
2064: goto unlock;
2065:
2066: /*
2067: * Update @tmr::sigqueue_seq for posix timer signals with sighand
2068: * locked to prevent a race against dequeue_signal().
2069: */
]
|
| 9/2 |
2026/11/18 05:04 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 9911
output: 32
thoughts: 408
Thoughts: **A Deep Dive into a Potential Race Condition**
Okay, take a look at this. I'm focusing on `posixtimer_get_target`. Inside that function, I see this check: `if (t && tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID && same_thread_group(t, current) && !(current->flags & PF_EXITING))`. Specifically, it's the `!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)` part that grabs my attention. It's reading `current->flags`.
Now, here's where it gets interesting. I've tracked down that the current task that was running `ns_capable_common`, where `current->flags` was being modified (specifically, `current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;`), was Task 12250. This modification happened within the context of `kcsan_setup_watchpoint / delay_tsc`. Crucially, a timer interrupt occurred on CPU 0 during this execution.
In an interrupt context, the `current` task *is* the interrupted task, which in this case, is our Task 12250! The timer interrupt calls `posix_timer_fn`, which runs in `hardirq` (specifically, `hrtimer_interrupt`). And that calls `posix_timer_queue_signal`, which leads to `posixtimer_send_sigqueue` and finally, `posixtimer_get_target` – the function we're analyzing.
So, here's the critical point: in `posixtimer_get_target`, we're reading `current->flags` in the check. But `current` is the same Task 12250 that *could* have its flags changed by the execution of `ns_capable_common` during interrupt context.
I see that the memory location `0xffff8881049be7ac` is the address of `¤t->flags`. We need to carefully investigate the struct layout of `task_struct` and determine the exact offset of `flags` to fully grasp the memory access and potential for a race. This all looks like a possible race condition.
|
| 10/2 |
2026/11/18 05:05 |
tool |
codesearch-struct-layout |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/capability.c Name:task_struct]
Results: map[Fields:[map[Name:thread_info OffsetBits:0 SizeBits:192] map[Name:__state OffsetBits:192 SizeBits:32] map[Name:saved_state OffsetBits:224 SizeBits:32] map[Name:stack OffsetBits:256 SizeBits:64] map[Name:usage OffsetBits:320 SizeBits:32] map[Name:flags OffsetBits:352 SizeBits:32] map[Name:ptrace OffsetBits:384 SizeBits:32] map[Name:on_cpu OffsetBits:416 SizeBits:8] map[Name:on_rq OffsetBits:424 SizeBits:8] map[Name:is_blocked OffsetBits:432 SizeBits:8] map[Name:__pad OffsetBits:440 SizeBits:8] map[Name:wake_entry OffsetBits:448 SizeBits:128] map[Name:wakee_flips OffsetBits:576 SizeBits:32] map[Name:wakee_flip_decay_ts OffsetBits:640 SizeBits:64] map[Name:last_wakee OffsetBits:704 SizeBits:64] map[Name:recent_used_cpu OffsetBits:768 SizeBits:32] map[Name:wake_cpu OffsetBits:800 SizeBits:32] map[Name:iowait_cpu OffsetBits:832 SizeBits:32] map[Name:prio OffsetBits:864 SizeBits:32] map[Name:static_prio OffsetBits:896 SizeBits:32] map[Name:normal_prio OffsetBits:928 SizeBits:32] map[Name:rt_priority OffsetBits:960 SizeBits:32] map[Name:se OffsetBits:1024 SizeBits:2560] map[Name:rt OffsetBits:3584 SizeBits:384] map[Name:dl OffsetBits:3968 SizeBits:2176] map[Name:dl_server OffsetBits:6144 SizeBits:64] map[Name:sched_class OffsetBits:6208 SizeBits:64] map[Name:sched_task_group OffsetBits:6272 SizeBits:64] map[Name:stats OffsetBits:6656 SizeBits:2048] map[Name:btrace_seq OffsetBits:8704 SizeBits:32] map[Name:policy OffsetBits:8736 SizeBits:32] map[Name:max_allowed_capacity OffsetBits:8768 SizeBits:64] map[Name:nr_cpus_allowed OffsetBits:8832 SizeBits:32] map[Name:cpus_ptr OffsetBits:8896 SizeBits:64] map[Name:user_cpus_ptr OffsetBits:8960 SizeBits:64] map[Name:cpus_mask OffsetBits:9024 SizeBits:64] map[Name:migration_pending OffsetBits:9088 SizeBits:64] map[Name:migration_disabled OffsetBits:9152 SizeBits:16] map[Name:migration_flags OffsetBits:9168 SizeBits:16] map[Name:rcu_read_lock_nesting OffsetBits:9184 SizeBits:32] map[Name:rcu_read_unlock_special OffsetBits:9216 SizeBits:32] map[Name:rcu_node_entry OffsetBits:9280 SizeBits:128] map[Name:rcu_blocked_node OffsetBits:9408 SizeBits:64] map[Name:rcu_tasks_nvcsw OffsetBits:9472 SizeBits:64] map[Name:rcu_tasks_holdout OffsetBits:9536 SizeBits:8] map[Name:rcu_tasks_idx OffsetBits:9544 SizeBits:8] map[Name:rcu_tasks_idle_cpu OffsetBits:9568 SizeBits:32] map[Name:rcu_tasks_holdout_list OffsetBits:9600 SizeBits:128] map[Name:rcu_tasks_exit_cpu OffsetBits:9728 SizeBits:32] map[Name:rcu_tasks_exit_list OffsetBits:9792 SizeBits:128] map[Name:trc_reader_nesting OffsetBits:9920 SizeBits:32] map[Name:trc_reader_scp OffsetBits:9984 SizeBits:64] map[Name:sched_info OffsetBits:10048 SizeBits:512] map[Name:tasks OffsetBits:10560 SizeBits:128] map[Name:pushable_tasks OffsetBits:10688 SizeBits:320] map[Name:pushable_dl_tasks OffsetBits:11008 SizeBits:192] map[Name:mm OffsetBits:11200 SizeBits:64] map[Name:active_mm OffsetBits:11264 SizeBits:64] map[Name:exec_state OffsetBits:11328 SizeBits:64] map[Name:exit_state OffsetBits:11392 SizeBits:32] map[Name:exit_code OffsetBits:11424 SizeBits:32] map[Name:exit_signal OffsetBits:11456 SizeBits:32] map[Name:pdeath_signal OffsetBits:11488 SizeBits:32] map[Name:jobctl OffsetBits:11520 SizeBits:64] map[Name:personality OffsetBits:11584 SizeBits:32] map[Name:sched_reset_on_fork OffsetBits:11616 SizeBits:1] map[Name:sched_contributes_to_load OffsetBits:11617 SizeBits:1] map[Name:sched_migrated OffsetBits:11618 SizeBits:1] map[Name:sched_task_hot OffsetBits:11619 SizeBits:1] map[Name: OffsetBits:11648 SizeBits:0] map[Name:sched_remote_wakeup OffsetBits:11648 SizeBits:1] map[Name:sched_rt_mutex OffsetBits:11649 SizeBits:1] map[Name:in_execve OffsetBits:11650 SizeBits:1] map[Name:in_iowait OffsetBits:11651 SizeBits:1] map[Name:restore_sigmask OffsetBits:11652 SizeBits:1] map[Name:in_user_fault OffsetBits:11653 SizeBits:1] map[Name:in_lru_fault OffsetBits:11654 SizeBits:1] map[Name:no_cgroup_migration OffsetBits:11655 SizeBits:1] map[Name:frozen OffsetBits:11656 SizeBits:1] map[Name:use_memdelay OffsetBits:11657 SizeBits:1] map[Name:in_eventfd OffsetBits:11658 SizeBits:1] map[Name:pasid_activated OffsetBits:11659 SizeBits:1] map[Name:reported_split_lock OffsetBits:11660 SizeBits:1] map[Name:in_thrashing OffsetBits:11661 SizeBits:1] map[Name:in_nf_duplicate OffsetBits:11662 SizeBits:1] map[Name:atomic_flags OffsetBits:11712 SizeBits:64] map[Name:restart_block OffsetBits:11776 SizeBits:448] map[Name:pid OffsetBits:12224 SizeBits:32] map[Name:tgid OffsetBits:12256 SizeBits:32] map[Name:stack_canary OffsetBits:12288 SizeBits:64] map[Name:real_parent OffsetBits:12352 SizeBits:64] map[Name:parent OffsetBits:12416 SizeBits:64] map[Name:children OffsetBits:12480 SizeBits:128] map[Name:sibling OffsetBits:12608 SizeBits:128] map[Name:group_leader OffsetBits:12736 SizeBits:64] map[Name:ptraced OffsetBits:12800 SizeBits:128] map[Name:ptrace_entry OffsetBits:12928 SizeBits:128] map[Name:thread_pid OffsetBits:13056 SizeBits:64] map[Name:pid_links OffsetBits:13120 SizeBits:512] map[Name:thread_node OffsetBits:13632 SizeBits:128] map[Name:vfork_done OffsetBits:13760 SizeBits:64] map[Name:set_child_tid OffsetBits:13824 SizeBits:64] map[Name:clear_child_tid OffsetBits:13888 SizeBits:64] map[Name:worker_private OffsetBits:13952 SizeBits:64] map[Name:utime OffsetBits:14016 SizeBits:64] map[Name:stime OffsetBits:14080 SizeBits:64] map[Name:gtime OffsetBits:14144 SizeBits:64] map[Name:prev_cputime OffsetBits:14208 SizeBits:192] map[Name:nvcsw OffsetBits:14400 SizeBits:64] map[Name:nivcsw OffsetBits:14464 SizeBits:64] map[Name:start_time OffsetBits:14528 SizeBits:64] map[Name:start_boottime OffsetBits:14592 SizeBits:64] map[Name:min_flt OffsetBits:14656 SizeBits:64] map[Name:maj_flt OffsetBits:14720 SizeBits:64] map[Name:posix_cputimers OffsetBits:14784 SizeBits:640] map[Name:posix_cputimers_work OffsetBits:15424 SizeBits:384] map[Name:ptracer_cred OffsetBits:15808 SizeBits:64] map[Name:real_cred OffsetBits:15872 SizeBits:64] map[Name:cred OffsetBits:15936 SizeBits:64] map[Name:cached_requested_key OffsetBits:16000 SizeBits:64] map[Name:comm OffsetBits:16064 SizeBits:128] map[Name:nameidata OffsetBits:16192 SizeBits:64] map[Name:sysvsem OffsetBits:16256 SizeBits:64] map[Name:sysvshm OffsetBits:16320 SizeBits:128] map[Name:real_fs OffsetBits:16448 SizeBits:64] map[Name:fs OffsetBits:16512 SizeBits:64] map[Name:files OffsetBits:16576 SizeBits:64] map[Name:io_uring OffsetBits:16640 SizeBits:64] map[Name:io_uring_restrict OffsetBits:16704 SizeBits:64] map[Name:nsproxy OffsetBits:16768 SizeBits:64] map[Name:signal OffsetBits:16832 SizeBits:64] map[Name:sighand OffsetBits:16896 SizeBits:64] map[Name:blocked OffsetBits:16960 SizeBits:64] map[Name:real_blocked OffsetBits:17024 SizeBits:64] map[Name:saved_sigmask OffsetBits:17088 SizeBits:64] map[Name:pending OffsetBits:17152 SizeBits:192] map[Name:sas_ss_sp OffsetBits:17344 SizeBits:64] map[Name:sas_ss_size OffsetBits:17408 SizeBits:64] map[Name:sas_ss_flags OffsetBits:17472 SizeBits:32] map[Name:task_works OffsetBits:17536 SizeBits:64] map[Name:audit_context OffsetBits:17600 SizeBits:64] map[Name:loginuid OffsetBits:17664 SizeBits:32] map[Name:sessionid OffsetBits:17696 SizeBits:32] map[Name:seccomp OffsetBits:17728 SizeBits:128] map[Name:syscall_dispatch OffsetBits:17856 SizeBits:256] map[Name:parent_exec_id OffsetBits:18112 SizeBits:64] map[Name:self_exec_id OffsetBits:18176 SizeBits:64] map[Name:alloc_lock OffsetBits:18240 SizeBits:32] map[Name:pi_lock OffsetBits:18272 SizeBits:32] map[Name:wake_q OffsetBits:18304 SizeBits:64] map[Name:pi_waiters OffsetBits:18368 SizeBits:128] map[Name:pi_top_task OffsetBits:18496 SizeBits:64] map[Name:pi_blocked_on OffsetBits:18560 SizeBits:64] map[Name:blocked_on OffsetBits:18624 SizeBits:64] map[Name:blocked_lock OffsetBits:18688 SizeBits:32] map[Name:blocked_donor OffsetBits:18752 SizeBits:64] map[Name:journal_info OffsetBits:18816 SizeBits:64] map[Name:bio_list OffsetBits:18880 SizeBits:64] map[Name:plug OffsetBits:18944 SizeBits:64] map[Name:reclaim_state OffsetBits:19008 SizeBits:64] map[Name:io_context OffsetBits:19072 SizeBits:64] map[Name:capture_control OffsetBits:19136 SizeBits:64] map[Name:ptrace_message OffsetBits:19200 SizeBits:64] map[Name:last_siginfo OffsetBits:19264 SizeBits:64] map[Name:ioac OffsetBits:19328 SizeBits:448] map[Name:acct_rss_mem1 OffsetBits:19776 SizeBits:64] map[Name:acct_vm_mem1 OffsetBits:19840 SizeBits:64] map[Name:acct_timexpd OffsetBits:19904 SizeBits:64] map[Name:mems_allowed OffsetBits:19968 SizeBits:64] map[Name:mems_allowed_seq OffsetBits:20032 SizeBits:32] map[Name:cpuset_mem_spread_rotor OffsetBits:20064 SizeBits:32] map[Name:cgroups OffsetBits:20096 SizeBits:64] map[Name:cg_list OffsetBits:20160 SizeBits:128] map[Name:futex OffsetBits:20288 SizeBits:576] map[Name:perf_recursion OffsetBits:20864 SizeBits:32] map[Name:perf_event_ctxp OffsetBits:20928 SizeBits:64] map[Name:perf_event_mutex OffsetBits:20992 SizeBits:192] map[Name:perf_event_list OffsetBits:21184 SizeBits:128] map[Name:perf_ctx_data OffsetBits:21312 SizeBits:64] map[Name:ipi_mask OffsetBits:21376 SizeBits:64] map[Name:mempolicy OffsetBits:21440 SizeBits:64] map[Name:il_prev OffsetBits:21504 SizeBits:16] map[Name:il_weight OffsetBits:21520 SizeBits:8] map[Name:pref_node_fork OffsetBits:21536 SizeBits:16] map[Name:cache_work OffsetBits:21568 SizeBits:128] map[Name:sched_cache_grp OffsetBits:21696 SizeBits:64] map[Name:preferred_llc OffsetBits:21760 SizeBits:32] map[Name:pref_llc_queued OffsetBits:21792 SizeBits:32] map[Name:rseq OffsetBits:21824 SizeBits:320] map[Name:mm_cid OffsetBits:22144 SizeBits:192] map[Name:tlb_ubc OffsetBits:22336 SizeBits:192] map[Name:splice_pipe OffsetBits:22528 SizeBits:64] map[Name:task_frag OffsetBits:22592 SizeBits:128] map[Name:delays OffsetBits:22720 SizeBits:64] map[Name:make_it_fail OffsetBits:22784 SizeBits:32] map[Name:fail_nth OffsetBits:22816 SizeBits:32] map[Name:nr_dirtied OffsetBits:22848 SizeBits:32] map[Name:nr_dirtied_pause OffsetBits:22880 SizeBits:32] map[Name:dirty_paused_when OffsetBits:22912 SizeBits:64] map[Name:timer_slack_ns OffsetBits:22976 SizeBits:64] map[Name:default_timer_slack_ns OffsetBits:23040 SizeBits:64] map[Name:kcsan_ctx OffsetBits:23104 SizeBits:384] map[Name:trace_recursion OffsetBits:23488 SizeBits:64] map[Name:kcov_mode OffsetBits:23552 SizeBits:32] map[Name:kcov_size OffsetBits:23584 SizeBits:32] map[Name:kcov_area OffsetBits:23616 SizeBits:64] map[Name:kcov OffsetBits:23680 SizeBits:64] map[Name:kcov_remote OffsetBits:23744 SizeBits:64] map[Name:kcov_handle OffsetBits:23808 SizeBits:64] map[Name:kcov_sequence OffsetBits:23872 SizeBits:32] map[Name:kcov_softirq OffsetBits:23904 SizeBits:32] map[Name:kcov_saved_mode OffsetBits:23936 SizeBits:32] map[Name:kcov_saved_size OffsetBits:23968 SizeBits:32] map[Name:kcov_saved_area OffsetBits:24000 SizeBits:64] map[Name:kcov_saved_kcov OffsetBits:24064 SizeBits:64] map[Name:kcov_saved_sequence OffsetBits:24128 SizeBits:32] map[Name:memcg_in_oom OffsetBits:24192 SizeBits:64] map[Name:memcg_nr_pages_over_high OffsetBits:24256 SizeBits:32] map[Name:active_memcg OffsetBits:24320 SizeBits:64] map[Name:objcg OffsetBits:24384 SizeBits:64] map[Name:throttle_disk OffsetBits:24448 SizeBits:64] map[Name:utask OffsetBits:24512 SizeBits:64] map[Name:kmap_ctrl OffsetBits:24576 SizeBits:0] map[Name:rcu OffsetBits:24576 SizeBits:128] map[Name:rcu_users OffsetBits:24704 SizeBits:32] map[Name:pagefault_disabled OffsetBits:24736 SizeBits:32] map[Name:oom_reaper_list OffsetBits:24768 SizeBits:64] map[Name:oom_reaper_timer OffsetBits:24832 SizeBits:320] map[Name:stack_vm_area OffsetBits:25152 SizeBits:64] map[Name:stack_refcount OffsetBits:25216 SizeBits:32] map[Name:security OffsetBits:25280 SizeBits:64] map[Name:bpf_storage OffsetBits:25344 SizeBits:64] map[Name:bpf_ctx OffsetBits:25408 SizeBits:64] map[Name:bpf_net_context OffsetBits:25472 SizeBits:64] map[Name:mce_vaddr OffsetBits:25536 SizeBits:64] map[Name:mce_kflags OffsetBits:25600 SizeBits:64] map[Name:mce_addr OffsetBits:25664 SizeBits:64] map[Name:mce_ripv OffsetBits:25728 SizeBits:1] map[Name:mce_whole_page OffsetBits:25729 SizeBits:1] map[Name:__mce_reserved OffsetBits:25730 SizeBits:62] map[Name:mce_kill_me OffsetBits:25792 SizeBits:128] map[Name:mce_count OffsetBits:25920 SizeBits:32] map[Name:l1d_flush_kill OffsetBits:25984 SizeBits:128] map[Name:unwind_info OffsetBits:26112 SizeBits:320] map[Name:thread OffsetBits:26432 SizeBits:1216]]]
|
| 11/2 |
2026/11/18 05:05 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 16627
output: 38
thoughts: 430
Thoughts: **Decoding a Kernel Context Switch**
Okay, so I'm looking at this memory dump and trying to piece together what happened. The key here is this `flags` offset, which I've just determined is at 44 bytes, or `0x2c`. And look, the address in the report, `0xffff8881049be7ac`, ends in `ac`, which is `0x780` plus `0x2c`. Bingo! That *is* the `task_struct::flags` field. Just to double-check, task 12250's `task_struct` base address is `0xffff8881049be780`. Adding `0x2c` to that gives me `0xffff8881049be7ac`. Four bytes of `current->flags` confirms the suspicion.
Now, to understand the context, task 12250 is running `capable(CAP_SYS_PACCT)` within `sys_acct`. `ns_capable_common` calls `security_capable`, and if it's permitted (returning 0), the kernel executes `current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;`.
Here's where it gets interesting: while task 12250 is running on CPU 0, a local APIC timer interrupt *also* happens on CPU 0. The interrupt handler sequence is `sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt` -> `hrtimer_interrupt` -> `posix_timer_fn`. Crucially, because it's *on the same CPU*, the `current` pointer in the interrupt context is still referring to the interrupted task, which is task 12250.
In `posix_timer_fn`, `posix_timer_queue_signal` gets called for a POSIX timer. So, let's dive into the code for `posix_timer_fn` and `posixtimer_send_sigqueue`, which is located in `kernel/time/posix-timers.c`, to see exactly what's going on here. This interrupt is occurring on the same CPU as the interrupted task, and therefore `current` refers to the same task. The task's privilege is being elevated from within an interrupt.
|
| 12/2 |
2026/11/18 05:06 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/time/posix-timers.c FirstLine:360 LineCount:40]
Results: map[Contents: 360:
361: if (!posixtimer_valid(timr))
362: return;
363:
364: timr->it_status = timr->it_interval ? POSIX_TIMER_REQUEUE_PENDING : POSIX_TIMER_DISARMED;
365: posixtimer_send_sigqueue(timr);
366: }
367:
368: /*
369: * This function gets called when a POSIX.1b interval timer expires from
370: * the HRTIMER interrupt (soft interrupt on RT kernels).
371: *
372: * Handles CLOCK_REALTIME, CLOCK_MONOTONIC, CLOCK_BOOTTIME and CLOCK_TAI
373: * based timers.
374: */
375: static enum hrtimer_restart posix_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
376: {
377: struct k_itimer *timr = container_of(timer, struct k_itimer, it.real.timer);
378:
379: guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&timr->it_lock);
380: posix_timer_queue_signal(timr);
381: return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
382: }
383:
384: long posixtimer_create_prctl(unsigned long ctrl)
385: {
386: switch (ctrl) {
387: case PR_TIMER_CREATE_RESTORE_IDS_OFF:
388: current->signal->timer_create_restore_ids = 0;
389: return 0;
390: case PR_TIMER_CREATE_RESTORE_IDS_ON:
391: current->signal->timer_create_restore_ids = 1;
392: return 0;
393: case PR_TIMER_CREATE_RESTORE_IDS_GET:
394: return current->signal->timer_create_restore_ids;
395: }
396: return -EINVAL;
397: }
398:
399: static struct pid *good_sigevent(sigevent_t * event)
]
|
| 13/2 |
2026/11/18 05:06 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18231
output: 40
thoughts: 40
Thoughts: Here's my analysis of the situation:
**Investigating Potential Issues with `posixtimer_get_target` and Signal Handling**
Alright, let's dive in. I need to get a clear picture of what's going on with either the `posixtimer_get_target` function or any recent modifications that might be affecting `posixtimer_send_sigqueue` within the `kernel/signal.c` file. My initial hunch is that something might have gone sideways with either of those. I'll start by checking the git log to examine the history of that specific function. I'll need to use `git log` to trace the commit history related to `posixtimer_get_target`. Failing that, I will also look at recent commits around the signal sending functions. Hopefully, this will lead me to the root cause of the problem. Time to dig into the version control.
|
| 14/2 |
2026/11/18 05:06 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Error:
Args: map[Count:5 PathPrefix:kernel/signal.c SymbolName:posixtimer_send_sigqueue]
Results:
|
| 15/2 |
2026/11/18 05:06 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18528
output: 40
thoughts: 14
Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:
**Analyzing Git History with Symbol and Source Context**
Right, so I'm thinking about how to effectively analyze the commit history related to a specific symbol in the codebase. My immediate inclination is to leverage `git-log`, but I need to be precise. The core idea is to invoke `git-log` with, at a minimum, the `SymbolName` and the `SourcePath`. This pairing is crucial. `SymbolName` gets me to the actual object, variable, function, etc., that I'm interested in, and `SourcePath` provides the contextual boundaries, guiding the search within the relevant files or directories. That's the baseline, the most direct approach to pinpointing the commits that touch that specific piece of code.
|
| 16/2 |
2026/11/18 05:08 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[Count:5 SourcePath:kernel/signal.c SymbolName:posixtimer_send_sigqueue]
Results: map[Output:d2710c8d938a signal: Prevent exec() race
8c4840277b6d signal/posixtimers: Handle ignore/blocked sequences correctly
cdc905d16b07 posix-timers: Fix spurious warning on double enqueue versus do_exit()
7a66f72b09bb posix-timers: Cleanup SIG_IGN workaround leftovers
df7a996b4dab signal: Queue ignored posixtimers on ignore list
]
|
| 17/2 |
2026/11/18 05:08 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 18882
output: 27
thoughts: 32
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those commits, presented as a personal thought process, as requested:
**Analyzing Commits `8c4840277b6d` and `cdc905d16b07`**
Alright, let's dive into these commits. First, I'm going to pull up the diffs for both `8c4840277b6d` and `cdc905d16b07`. I want to quickly gauge the scope of the changes. Are we talking about a minor tweak or a significant refactor? And more importantly, are there any potential conflicts or dependencies I need to be aware of?
Looking at the first commit, `8c4840277b6d`, the file tree and change statistics will be paramount here. I'll be looking for changes to core modules. Were any existing design patterns altered? Are there any potential performance implications I need to consider? More specifically, were any changes made to the internal data structures, and how does this affect downstream dependencies?
Now, let's move on to `cdc905d16b07`. This one, judging by the commit message, looks like it might touch the integration tests or some kind of refactor on the testing architecture. I'll need to scrutinize the test coverage. Are the test cases comprehensive enough to validate the changes introduced in the previous commit? Have any new test cases been added to address potential edge cases? I will look for any code comments, and documentation that I can refer to.
Basically, I'm trying to determine if these commits represent a safe, well-tested increment or a potential source of headaches down the road. I'll pay close attention to the merge conflicts or potential conflicts, and the test reports. Let's see how well these changes integrate.
|
| 18/2 |
2026/11/18 05:09 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 8c4840277b6daffe09dea0338f3fce1eb4319a43
Author: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Date: Tue Jan 14 18:28:44 2025 +0100
signal/posixtimers: Handle ignore/blocked sequences correctly
syzbot triggered the warning in posixtimer_send_sigqueue(), which warns
about a non-ignored signal being already queued on the ignored list.
The warning is actually bogus, as the following sequence causes this:
signal($SIG, SIGIGN);
timer_settime(...); // arm periodic timer
timer fires, signal is ignored and queued on ignored list
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, ...); // block the signal
timer_settime(...); // re-arm periodic timer
timer fires, signal is not ignored because it is blocked
---> Warning triggers as signal is on the ignored list
Ideally timer_settime() could remove the signal, but that's racy and
incomplete vs. other scenarios and requires a full reevaluation of the
pending signal list.
Instead of adding more complexity, handle it gracefully by removing the
warning and requeueing the signal to the pending list. That's correct
versus:
1) sig[timed]wait() as that does not check for SIGIGN and only relies on
dequeue_signal() -> posixtimers_deliver_signal() to check whether the
pending signal is still valid.
2) Unblocking of the signal.
- If the unblocking happens before SIGIGN is replaced by a signal
handler, then the timer is rearmed in dequeue_signal(), but
get_signal() will ignore it. The next timer expiry will move it back
to the ignored list.
- If SIGIGN was replaced before unblocking, then the signal will be
delivered and a subsequent expiry will queue a signal on the pending
list again.
There is a related scenario to trigger the complementary warning in the
signal ignored path, which does not expect the signal to be on the pending
list when it is ignored. That can be triggered even before the above change
via:
task1 task2
signal($SIG, SIGIGN);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, ...);
timer_create(); // Signal target is task2
timer_settime(...); // arm periodic timer
timer fires, signal is not ignored because it is blocked
and queued on the pending list of task2
syscall()
// Sets the pending flag
sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, ...);
-> preemption, task2 cannot dequeue the signal
timer_settime(...); // re-arm periodic timer
timer fires, signal is ignored
---> Warning triggers as signal is on task2's pending list
and the thread group is not exiting
Consequently, remove that warning too and just keep the signal on the
pending list.
The following attempt to deliver the signal on return to user space of
task2 will ignore the signal and a subsequent expiry will bring it back to
the ignored list, if it did not get blocked or un-ignored before that.
Fixes: df7a996b4dab ("signal: Queue ignored posixtimers on ignore list")
Reported-by: syzbot+3c2e3cc60665d71de2f7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/87ikqhcnjn.ffs@tglx
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 989b1cc9116a..a2afd54303f0 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2007,11 +2007,22 @@ void posixtimer_send_sigqueue(struct k_itimer *tmr)
if (!list_empty(&q->list)) {
/*
- * If task group is exiting with the signal already pending,
- * wait for __exit_signal() to do its job. Otherwise if
- * ignored, it's not supposed to be queued. Try to survive.
+ * The signal was ignored and blocked. The timer
+ * expiry queued it because blocked signals are
+ * queued independent of the ignored state.
+ *
+ * The unblocking set SIGPENDING, but the signal
+ * was not yet dequeued from the pending list.
+ * So prepare_signal() sees unblocked and ignored,
+ * which ends up here. Leave it queued like a
+ * regular signal.
+ *
+ * The same happens when the task group is exiting
+ * and the signal is already queued.
+ * prepare_signal() treats SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT as
+ * ignored independent of its queued state. This
+ * gets cleaned up in __exit_signal().
*/
- WARN_ON_ONCE(!(t->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT));
goto out;
}
@@ -2046,17 +2057,25 @@ void posixtimer_send_sigqueue(struct k_itimer *tmr)
goto out;
}
- /* This should never happen and leaks a reference count */
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!hlist_unhashed(&tmr->ignored_list)))
- hlist_del_init(&tmr->ignored_list);
-
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&q->list))) {
/* This holds a reference count already */
result = TRACE_SIGNAL_ALREADY_PENDING;
goto out;
}
- posixtimer_sigqueue_getref(q);
+ /*
+ * If the signal is on the ignore list, it got blocked after it was
+ * ignored earlier. But nothing lifted the ignore. Move it back to
+ * the pending list to be consistent with the regular signal
+ * handling. This already holds a reference count.
+ *
+ * If it's not on the ignore list acquire a reference count.
+ */
+ if (likely(hlist_unhashed(&tmr->ignored_list)))
+ posixtimer_sigqueue_getref(q);
+ else
+ hlist_del_init(&tmr->ignored_list);
+
posixtimer_queue_sigqueue(q, t, tmr->it_pid_type);
result = TRACE_SIGNAL_DELIVERED;
out:
]
|
| 19/2 |
2026/11/18 05:09 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21048
output: 29
thoughts: 36
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, assuming I'm deep in the weeds of kernel development or a similar low-level system.
**Diving into the History of `posixtimer_get_target`**
Right, so I need to understand something about how the POSIX timer implementation is working. I need to figure out when the `posixtimer_get_target` function was first introduced or maybe changed in a significant way. The commit history is the obvious place to go. I'm going to track down commit `d2710c8d938a` directly, as that seems like a good starting point. Perhaps there's a related issue or context associated with that specific commit. Or, if that doesn't yield results, I'll need to go further back and identify the first instance, the initial commit that contains `posixtimer_get_target` or the most relevant modification. It's time to fire up the git tools and dig in.
|
| 20/2 |
2026/11/18 05:10 |
tool |
git-log |
10m
Error:
Args: map[CodeRegexp:posixtimer_get_target Count:5]
Results:
|
| 21/2 |
2026/11/18 05:20 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21364
output: 40
thoughts: 11
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience:
**Adding `PathPrefix` to `git-log` - Initial Considerations**
Alright, so the task at hand is to integrate `PathPrefix` functionality into the `git-log` command. My initial thinking leans towards considering the implications of this addition, given the potential for subtle shifts in behavior and the need for careful implementation. I'm already mentally running through a few use cases. The immediate benefits are obvious: it would allow for much more precise and focused history searches within a specific directory or subtree of a repository. This could prove invaluable for large projects, particularly those with complex directory structures where a full log would be overwhelming. I anticipate it improving the ability to diagnose regressions, understand feature development, and more clearly document changes tied to a specific area.
I start running through the practical considerations. What sort of syntax makes the most sense? Should we use a flag like `--path-prefix=<path>`? Or perhaps integrate it as a parameter, analogous to the existing `<path>` argument but with a clearer distinction? A dedicated flag could offer more clarity and flexibility. I need to keep in mind possible conflicts with existing `git-log` options, and how it interacts with other arguments like `--follow`, `--all`, and `--since`. I'm starting to consider how to handle edge cases, particularly those involving symbolic links or changes that affect files across the target path, as well as considering how to manage permissions and repositories that span multiple volumes.
Performance is another major consideration. Adding path filtering *should* ideally improve performance when targeting a path prefix, but I need to avoid introducing any slowdowns in cases where the prefix isn't specified. I am imagining the most efficient data structures and algorithms under the hood, I'm thinking about the index and the commit graph, and how to utilize them efficiently. I'll need to explore how the new functionality interacts with the various backend storage methods (packfiles, loose objects, etc.). This means a careful review of the existing codebase to identify the best integration points to avoid creating unnecessary bottlenecks.
Finally, I'm thinking about the user experience. The goal is an elegant and intuitive implementation that is easy to understand. The documentation will have to be perfect, and I'll need to run some unit and integration tests covering the full range of potential scenarios. I also begin imagining potential test cases for this.
|
| 22/2 |
2026/11/18 05:22 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:posixtimer_get_target Count:5 PathPrefix:kernel/signal.c]
Results: map[Output:d2710c8d938a signal: Prevent exec() race
caf77435dd8a signal: Handle ignored signals in do_sigaction(action != SIG_IGN)
0360ed14d982 signal: Refactor send_sigqueue()
]
|
| 23/2 |
2026/11/18 05:22 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 21995
output: 26
thoughts: 18
Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into commit `0360ed14d982`.
**Analyzing Commit `0360ed14d982`**
Alright, I'm pulling up that commit now. My initial scan is for any obvious red flags, looking for changes in core algorithms or fundamental data structures that might necessitate a deep dive. I'm focusing particularly on areas I've been involved in recently. Are there any alterations that could impact performance, or introduce subtle bugs? I'll be checking if the changes align with the documented architectural guidelines. I'm noting potential for new edge cases now. Is the code clean and well-commented, or is it a bit of a mess that'll need some immediate refactoring? I'm hoping it's the former, of course, because that tells me how much thought and care was put in. My goal is to quickly assess the change's impact and identify any immediate concerns that need addressing. Any potential integration issues with the existing system need to be flagged. Ultimately, I'll be making a judgement if it is a simple fix, or something that needs more work and review.
|
| 24/2 |
2026/11/18 05:23 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit 0360ed14d9826678a50fa2b873e522a24cd3c018
Author: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Date: Tue Nov 5 09:14:42 2024 +0100
signal: Refactor send_sigqueue()
To handle posix timers which have their signal ignored via SIG_IGN properly
it is required to requeue a ignored signal for delivery when SIG_IGN is
lifted so the timer gets rearmed.
Split the required code out of send_sigqueue() so it can be reused in
context of sigaction().
While at it rename send_sigqueue() to posixtimer_send_sigqueue() so its
clear what this is about.
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241105064213.586453412@linutronix.de
diff --git a/include/linux/posix-timers.h b/include/linux/posix-timers.h
index 947176582de9..52611ea923b2 100644
--- a/include/linux/posix-timers.h
+++ b/include/linux/posix-timers.h
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ static inline void posix_cputimers_rt_watchdog(struct posix_cputimers *pct,
void posixtimer_rearm_itimer(struct task_struct *p);
bool posixtimer_init_sigqueue(struct sigqueue *q);
+int posixtimer_send_sigqueue(struct k_itimer *tmr);
bool posixtimer_deliver_signal(struct kernel_siginfo *info);
void posixtimer_free_timer(struct k_itimer *timer);
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/signal.h b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
index bd9f569231d9..36283c1c55e9 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/signal.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/signal.h
@@ -340,7 +340,6 @@ extern int send_sig(int, struct task_struct *, int);
extern int zap_other_threads(struct task_struct *p);
extern struct sigqueue *sigqueue_alloc(void);
extern void sigqueue_free(struct sigqueue *);
-extern int send_sigqueue(struct sigqueue *, struct pid *, enum pid_type, int si_private);
extern int do_sigaction(int, struct k_sigaction *, struct k_sigaction *);
static inline void clear_notify_signal(void)
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 911ed3ab479e..5b71e26abb0e 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -1947,40 +1947,54 @@ void sigqueue_free(struct sigqueue *q)
__sigqueue_free(q);
}
-int send_sigqueue(struct sigqueue *q, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type, int si_private)
+static void posixtimer_queue_sigqueue(struct sigqueue *q, struct task_struct *t, enum pid_type type)
{
- int sig = q->info.si_signo;
struct sigpending *pending;
+ int sig = q->info.si_signo;
+
+ signalfd_notify(t, sig);
+ pending = (type != PIDTYPE_PID) ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
+ list_add_tail(&q->list, &pending->list);
+ sigaddset(&pending->signal, sig);
+ complete_signal(sig, t, type);
+}
+
+/*
+ * This function is used by POSIX timers to deliver a timer signal.
+ * Where type is PIDTYPE_PID (such as for timers with SIGEV_THREAD_ID
+ * set), the signal must be delivered to the specific thread (queues
+ * into t->pending).
+ *
+ * Where type is not PIDTYPE_PID, signals must be delivered to the
+ * process. In this case, prefer to deliver to current if it is in
+ * the same thread group as the target process, which avoids
+ * unnecessarily waking up a potentially idle task.
+ */
+static inline struct task_struct *posixtimer_get_target(struct k_itimer *tmr)
+{
+ struct task_struct *t = pid_task(tmr->it_pid, tmr->it_pid_type);
+
+ if (t && tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID && same_thread_group(t, current))
+ t = current;
+ return t;
+}
+
+int posixtimer_send_sigqueue(struct k_itimer *tmr)
+{
+ struct sigqueue *q = tmr->sigq;
+ int sig = q->info.si_signo;
struct task_struct *t;
unsigned long flags;
int ret, result;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(q->flags & SIGQUEUE_PREALLOC)))
- return 0;
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(q->info.si_code != SI_TIMER))
- return 0;
-
- ret = -1;
- rcu_read_lock();
+ guard(rcu)();
- /*
- * This function is used by POSIX timers to deliver a timer signal.
- * Where type is PIDTYPE_PID (such as for timers with SIGEV_THREAD_ID
- * set), the signal must be delivered to the specific thread (queues
- * into t->pending).
- *
- * Where type is not PIDTYPE_PID, signals must be delivered to the
- * process. In this case, prefer to deliver to current if it is in
- * the same thread group as the target process, which avoids
- * unnecessarily waking up a potentially idle task.
- */
- t = pid_task(pid, type);
+ t = posixtimer_get_target(tmr);
if (!t)
- goto ret;
- if (type != PIDTYPE_PID && same_thread_group(t, current))
- t = current;
+ return -1;
+
if (!likely(lock_task_sighand(t, &flags)))
- goto ret;
+ return -1;
/*
* Update @q::info::si_sys_private for posix timer signals with
@@ -1988,30 +2002,24 @@ int send_sigqueue(struct sigqueue *q, struct pid *pid, enum pid_type type, int s
* decides based on si_sys_private whether to invoke
* posixtimer_rearm() or not.
*/
- q->info.si_sys_private = si_private;
+ q->info.si_sys_private = tmr->it_signal_seq;
ret = 1; /* the signal is ignored */
- result = TRACE_SIGNAL_IGNORED;
- if (!prepare_signal(sig, t, false))
+ if (!prepare_signal(sig, t, false)) {
+ result = TRACE_SIGNAL_IGNORED;
goto out;
+ }
ret = 0;
if (unlikely(!list_empty(&q->list))) {
result = TRACE_SIGNAL_ALREADY_PENDING;
goto out;
}
-
- signalfd_notify(t, sig);
- pending = (type != PIDTYPE_PID) ? &t->signal->shared_pending : &t->pending;
- list_add_tail(&q->list, &pending->list);
- sigaddset(&pending->signal, sig);
- complete_signal(sig, t, type);
+ posixtimer_queue_sigqueue(q, t, tmr->it_pid_type);
result = TRACE_SIGNAL_DELIVERED;
out:
- trace_signal_generate(sig, &q->info, t, type != PIDTYPE_PID, result);
+ trace_signal_generate(sig, &q->info, t, tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID, result);
unlock_task_sighand(t, &flags);
-ret:
- rcu_read_unlock();
return ret;
}
#endif /* CONFIG_POSIX_TIMERS */
diff --git a/kernel/time/posix-timers.c b/kernel/time/posix-timers.c
index f18d64c7cd3b..0901ed9ca183 100644
--- a/kernel/time/posix-timers.c
+++ b/kernel/time/posix-timers.c
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ int posix_timer_queue_signal(struct k_itimer *timr)
timr->it_status = state;
- ret = send_sigqueue(timr->sigq, timr->it_pid, timr->it_pid_type, timr->it_signal_seq);
+ ret = posixtimer_send_sigqueue(timr);
/* If we failed to send the signal the timer stops. */
return ret > 0;
}
]
|
| 25/2 |
2026/11/18 05:23 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 24778
output: 25
thoughts: 33
Thoughts: Here's my analysis of the provided context, framed as a thought process:
**Diving into Commit `cdc905d16b07`**
Okay, let's take a look at commit `cdc905d16b07`. I want to understand the implication of adding `!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)`. This fragment seems to be checking if a process isn't in the process of exiting. I immediately start thinking about where this conditional is being used. What's the context in the kernel's execution path? Is it in a scheduler function, an interrupt handler, a signal delivery routine, memory management? The presence of `current->flags` suggests it has something to do with the currently running process. I'm already imagining scenarios where ensuring a process hasn't begun exiting is critical. Maybe we are preventing resource leaks, dangling pointers, double frees or attempting an action that can't succeed. This is all standard low level kernel stuff. I'll need to look at the surrounding code to determine the exact intent.
|
| 26/2 |
2026/11/18 05:24 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit cdc905d16b07981363e53a21853ba1cf6cd8e92a
Author: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Date: Sun Nov 17 00:48:23 2024 +0100
posix-timers: Fix spurious warning on double enqueue versus do_exit()
A timer sigqueue may find itself already pending when it is tried to
be enqueued. This situation can happen if the timer sigqueue is enqueued
but then the timer is reset afterwards and fires before the pending
signal managed to be delivered.
However when such a double enqueue occurs while the corresponding signal
is ignored, the sigqueue is expected to be found either on the dedicated
ignored list if the timer was periodic or dropped if the timer was
one-shot. In any case it is not supposed to be queued on the real signal
queue.
An assertion verifies the latter expectation on top of the return value
of prepare_signal(), assuming "false" means that the signal is being
ignored. But prepare_signal() may also fail if the target is exiting as
the last task of its group. In this case the double enqueue observes the
sigqueue queued, as in such a situation:
TASK A (same group as B) TASK B (same group as A)
------------------------ ------------------------
// timer event
// queue signal to TASK B
posix_timer_queue_signal()
// reset timer through syscall
do_timer_settime()
// exit, leaving task B alone
do_exit()
do_exit()
synchronize_group_exit()
signal->flags = SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
// ========> <IRQ> timer event
posix_timer_queue_signal()
// return false due to SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT
if (!prepare_signal())
WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&q->list))
And this spuriously triggers this warning:
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5854 at kernel/signal.c:2008 posixtimer_send_sigqueue
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5854 Comm: syz-executor139 Not tainted 6.12.0-rc6-next-20241108-syzkaller #0
RIP: 0010:posixtimer_send_sigqueue+0x9da/0xbc0 kernel/signal.c:2008
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
alarm_handle_timer
alarmtimer_fired
__run_hrtimer
__hrtimer_run_queues
hrtimer_interrupt
local_apic_timer_interrupt
__sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt
instr_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt
sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt
</IRQ>
Fortunately the recovery code in that case already does the right thing:
just exit from posixtimer_send_sigqueue() and wait for __exit_signal()
to flush the pending signal. Just make sure to warn only the case when
the sigqueue is queued and the signal is really ignored.
Fixes: df7a996b4dab ("signal: Queue ignored posixtimers on ignore list")
Reported-by: syzbot+852e935b899bde73626e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Signed-off-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: syzbot+852e935b899bde73626e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20241116234823.28497-1-frederic@kernel.org
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/673549c6.050a0220.1324f8.008c.GAE@google.com
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index cbf70c808969..10b464b9d91f 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -2003,9 +2003,15 @@ void posixtimer_send_sigqueue(struct k_itimer *tmr)
if (!prepare_signal(sig, t, false)) {
result = TRACE_SIGNAL_IGNORED;
- /* Paranoia check. Try to survive. */
- if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&q->list)))
+ if (!list_empty(&q->list)) {
+ /*
+ * If task group is exiting with the signal already pending,
+ * wait for __exit_signal() to do its job. Otherwise if
+ * ignored, it's not supposed to be queued. Try to survive.
+ */
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(!(t->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT));
goto out;
+ }
/* Periodic timers with SIG_IGN are queued on the ignored list */
if (tmr->it_sig_periodic) {
]
|
| 27/2 |
2026/11/18 05:24 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 26428
output: 27
thoughts: 31
Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on those thoughts, as if they're my own:
**Analyzing Commit d2710c8d938a**
Alright, my internal review process is engaged. I'm focusing in on commit `d2710c8d938a`. My immediate focus? The specific file or function that was modified in the commit, specifically `posixtimer_get_target`. The change to `posixtimer_get_target` is what matters here. I will want to understand the impact of this. What was the rationale behind the modification? Was it a bug fix, an optimization, or a feature addition? Understanding the context will be critical. I'll need to thoroughly examine the surrounding code and possibly related commits to fully grasp the ramifications of this adjustment. And, of course, I'll be looking for potential regressions.
|
| 28/2 |
2026/11/18 05:24 |
tool |
git-show |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Output:commit d2710c8d938ae6a825a6463158e6e6f31eac792a
Author: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Date: Fri Sep 11 11:09:12 2026 +0200
signal: Prevent exec() race
Hyunwoo debugged the following KASAN UAF splat:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __send_signal_locked+0xb27/0xba0
Write of size 8 at addr ffff888007ed80c8 by task poc/79
...
Call Trace:
__send_signal_locked+0xb27/0xba0
do_send_sig_info+0xa7/0x160
do_send_specific+0x76/0xa0
__x64_sys_tgkill+0x193/0x270
...
Allocated by task 80:
do_timer_create+0x1a4/0x1030
__x64_sys_timer_create+0x145/0x190
...
Freed by task 12:
kmem_cache_free_bulk+0x1f8/0x4a0
kvfree_rcu_bulk+0x14f/0x1c0
kfree_rcu_work+0x128/0x1a0
...
Last potentially related work creation:
kvfree_call_rcu+0x39/0x390
__flush_itimer_signals+0x211/0x320
flush_itimer_signals+0x47/0x90
begin_new_exec+0xa6b/0x28c0
It turned out that this happens with a non-leader exec() as Hyunwoo
explained:
de_thread() calls exchange_tids() before release_task(leader), so the
struct pid held by a SIGEV_THREAD_ID timer created against the leader's tid
now points to the thread which called execve(). pid_task() returns that
thread and lock_task_sighand() on it succeeds.
If the timer signal is blocked, its sigqueue stays queued on the leader's
task::pending. The next expiry of that timer can then run while
release_task() flushes the queue.
posixtimer_send_sigqueue() checks whether the sigqueue is already queued
with a plain list_empty(), which only reads list_head::next.
list_del_init() is not atomic and INIT_LIST_HEAD() stores list_head::next
before list_head::prev, so the check can pass in between. list_add_tail()
queues the entry on the task::pending of the live thread, and the
list_head::prev store from the flush then overwrites the list_head::prev
link that list_add_tail() has just set.
__flush_itimer_signals() does not undo that either. With list_head::prev
pointing at the entry itself, its list_del_init() only stores the same
values again, so the entry is not removed from the list. It is still there
after the last reference is dropped and the timer is freed by RCU, and the
list_add_tail() of a later tgkill() follows that list_head::prev into the
freed timer.
This problem surfaced with the recent commit which moved the sigqueue flush
out of the sighand lock held region.
Hyonwoo proposed to fix this by using list_del_init_careful(), but that
just papers over the problem. After some disucssions and various attempts
to solve it, Eric pointed out that there is no reason to flush
task::pending late in release_task() and it should be done in
exit_signals() already.
As nothing can collect and deliver signals which are queued in a dying
task's pending queue, there is no reason to delay it further.
But it has to be ensured that no signals can be queued into it after that
point. exit_signals() sets PF_EXITING in task::flags, which can be used as
an indicator for this.
Cure it by:
- Preventing signal queueing for task private signals (PIDTYPE_PID) when
the task has PF_EXITING set in __send_signal_locked() and in
posixtimer_send_sigqueue().
- Protecting the unlocked setting of PF_EXITING in exit_signals() for the
task group empty and the group exit case with sighand lock
- Flushing task::pending signals right there.
Optimize that by moving the whole pending list to an on-stack list head
under sighand lock and free the signals without the lock held.
There has been quite some discussion about the lockless flush and the
non-leader exec case on weakly ordered systems. The problem is that a third
party which tries to send a posix timer signal relies on the PID lookup to
find the target task and that lookup might result in the new leader when
the signal was originaly directed to the old leader. In case that the
signal was queued on the old leader then the lockless flush raised a
concern over the following situation:
old_leader new_leader third party
A: flush_list() // list_del_init() stores to sigqueue
LOCK (tasklist)
old_leader->exit_state = EXIT_ZOMBIE;
B: UNLOCK (tasklist)
C: LOCK (tasklist)
if (old_leader->exit_state)
transfer_tids()
D: store PID
posix_timer_send_sigqueue()
// Observes #D so t = new_leader
E: t = get_target()
F: LOCK (sighand)
G: if (list_empty(sigqueue))
list_add(sigqueue)
The concern was that the third party might observe #D but not observe #A
and therefore would proceed to #G while the list_del() stores (#A) in
flush_list() are not visible yet, which could result in list corruption.
That would be possible if looking at it solely from a RELEASE+ACQUIRE
ordering point of view, but B-C is a UNLOCK+LOCK hand-over, which is not
the same as RELEASE+ACQUIRE:
RELEASE+ACQUIRE: RCpc, only the CPUs involved agree on the ordering
UNLOCK+LOCK: RCtso, the hand-over is store-ordering
As B-C is UNLOCK+LOCK, which is RCtso and that does impose store order,
A stores must happen before the D store.
Combine with E-F, which has a data dependency from the LOAD to the LOCK and
thereby constraints later LOADs, those sigqueue loads in G that come after
F must in fact observe the A stores.
Fixes: fb3bbcfe344e ("exit: change the release_task() paths to call flush_sigqueue() lockless")
Reported-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Debugged-by: Hyunwoo Kim <imv4bel@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: "Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Kijo Park <red993688@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260911090541.572536604@kernel.org
Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/aok1rdkBgZsynHZB@v4bel
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 4e028f157597..424c44a42a4d 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -302,12 +302,13 @@ void release_task(struct task_struct *p)
free_pids(post.pids);
release_thread(p);
/*
- * This task was already removed from the process/thread/pid lists
- * and lock_task_sighand(p) can't succeed. Nobody else can touch
- * ->pending or, if group dead, signal->shared_pending. We can call
- * flush_sigqueue() lockless.
+ * This task was already removed from the process/thread/pid lists and
+ * lock_task_sighand(p) can't succeed. If it's the group leader then
+ * flush tsk->signal->shared_pending. tsk->pending has been flushed
+ * already in exit_signals(). Nothing else can touch
+ * signal->shared_pending anymore, so flush_sigqueue() can be invoked
+ * lockless.
*/
- flush_sigqueue(&p->pending);
if (thread_group_leader(p))
flush_sigqueue(&p->signal->shared_pending);
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index ec30550951ec..d31ebcb6ed4d 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -457,18 +457,42 @@ static void __sigqueue_free(struct sigqueue *q)
kmem_cache_free(sigqueue_cachep, q);
}
-void flush_sigqueue(struct sigpending *queue)
+/*
+ * flush_sigqueue_list() can only be invoked without holding sighand::siglock in
+ * the following cases:
+ *
+ * 1) When flushing task::pending _after_ setting task::flags PF_EXITING
+ *
+ * All functions which try to send a signal to @task will observe PF_EXITING
+ * and drop the signal.
+ *
+ * 2) When flushing task::signal::shared_pending _after_ the last task in a
+ * thread group was unhashed and task::sighand is NULL.
+ *
+ * Nothing can queue a signal anymore because sighand is NULL.
+ */
+static void flush_sigqueue_list(struct list_head *head)
{
- struct sigqueue *q;
+ struct sigqueue *q, *tmp;
- sigemptyset(&queue->signal);
- while (!list_empty(&queue->list)) {
- q = list_entry(queue->list.next, struct sigqueue , list);
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(q, tmp, head, list) {
list_del_init(&q->list);
__sigqueue_free(q);
}
}
+void flush_sigqueue(struct sigpending *queue)
+{
+ sigemptyset(&queue->signal);
+ flush_sigqueue_list(&queue->list);
+}
+
+static void sigqueue_dequeue_pending(struct sigpending *queue, struct list_head *head)
+{
+ sigemptyset(&queue->signal);
+ list_splice_init(&queue->list, head);
+}
+
/*
* Flush all pending signals for this kthread.
*/
@@ -1019,6 +1043,21 @@ static inline bool legacy_queue(struct sigpending *signals, int sig)
return (sig < SIGRTMIN) && sigismember(&signals->signal, sig);
}
+/*
+ * When PF_EXITING is set the task is on the way out and has t::pending
+ * flushed already. Prevent queueing of PIDTYPE_PID signals as they would
+ * be leaked.
+ */
+static inline bool task_can_queue_signal(struct task_struct *t, enum pid_type type)
+{
+ lockdep_assert_held(&t->sighand->siglock);
+
+ if (!(t->flags & PF_EXITING))
+ return true;
+
+ return type != PIDTYPE_PID;
+}
+
static int __send_signal_locked(int sig, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
struct task_struct *t, enum pid_type type, bool force)
{
@@ -1030,6 +1069,10 @@ static int __send_signal_locked(int sig, struct kernel_siginfo *info,
lockdep_assert_held(&t->sighand->siglock);
result = TRACE_SIGNAL_IGNORED;
+
+ if (!task_can_queue_signal(t, type))
+ goto ret;
+
if (!prepare_signal(sig, t, force))
goto ret;
@@ -1980,11 +2023,25 @@ static inline struct task_struct *posixtimer_get_target(struct k_itimer *tmr)
struct task_struct *t = pid_task(tmr->it_pid, tmr->it_pid_type);
if (t && tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID &&
- same_thread_group(t, current) && !current->exit_state)
+ same_thread_group(t, current) && !(current->flags & PF_EXITING))
t = current;
return t;
}
+/*
+ * Find the target task for the POSIX timer signal and prevent that a
+ * PIDTYPE_PID signal is queued on a task which has PF_EXITING set.
+ */
+static inline struct task_struct *posixtimer_get_unignore_target(struct k_itimer *tmr)
+{
+ struct task_struct *t = posixtimer_get_target(tmr);
+
+ if (t && task_can_queue_signal(t, tmr->it_pid_type))
+ return t;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
void posixtimer_send_sigqueue(struct k_itimer *tmr)
{
struct sigqueue *q = &tmr->sigq;
@@ -2002,6 +2059,9 @@ void posixtimer_send_sigqueue(struct k_itimer *tmr)
if (!likely(lock_task_sighand(t, &flags)))
return;
+ if (!task_can_queue_signal(t, tmr->it_pid_type))
+ goto unlock;
+
/*
* Update @tmr::sigqueue_seq for posix timer signals with sighand
* locked to prevent a race against dequeue_signal().
@@ -2093,6 +2153,7 @@ void posixtimer_send_sigqueue(struct k_itimer *tmr)
result = TRACE_SIGNAL_DELIVERED;
out:
trace_signal_generate(sig, &q->info, t, tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID, result);
+unlock:
unlock_task_sighand(t, &flags);
}
@@ -2148,7 +2209,7 @@ static void posixtimer_sig_unignore(struct task_struct *tsk, int sig)
* has exited by now, drop the reference count.
*/
guard(rcu)();
- target = posixtimer_get_target(tmr);
+ target = posixtimer_get_unignore_target(tmr);
if (target)
posixtimer_queue_sigqueue(&tmr->sigq, target, tmr->it_pid_type);
else
@@ -3132,42 +3193,36 @@ static void retarget_shared_pending(struct task_struct *tsk, sigset_t *which)
void exit_signals(struct task_struct *tsk)
{
+ LIST_HEAD(sigq_list);
int group_stop = 0;
- sigset_t unblocked;
/*
* @tsk is about to have PF_EXITING set - lock out users which
- * expect stable threadgroup.
+ * expect a stable threadgroup.
*/
cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin(tsk);
- if (thread_group_empty(tsk) || (tsk->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
+ scoped_guard(spinlock_irq, &tsk->sighand->siglock) {
tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING;
- cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
- return;
- }
- spin_lock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
- /*
- * From now this task is not visible for group-wide signals,
- * see wants_signal(), do_signal_stop().
- */
- tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING;
+ sigqueue_dequeue_pending(&tsk->pending, &sigq_list);
- cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
+ if (task_sigpending(tsk) && !thread_group_empty(tsk) &&
+ !(tsk->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
+ sigset_t unblocked = tsk->blocked;
- if (!task_sigpending(tsk))
- goto out;
+ signotset(&unblocked);
+ retarget_shared_pending(tsk, &unblocked);
- unblocked = tsk->blocked;
- signotset(&unblocked);
- retarget_shared_pending(tsk, &unblocked);
+ if (unlikely(tsk->jobctl & JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING) &&
+ task_participate_group_stop(tsk))
+ group_stop = CLD_STOPPED;
+ }
+ }
- if (unlikely(tsk->jobctl & JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING) &&
- task_participate_group_stop(tsk))
- group_stop = CLD_STOPPED;
-out:
- spin_unlock_irq(&tsk->sighand->siglock);
+ cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
+
+ flush_sigqueue_list(&sigq_list);
/*
* If group stop has completed, deliver the notification. This
]
|
| 29/2 |
2026/11/18 05:24 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 31373
output: 44
thoughts: 534
Thoughts: **Analyzing a POSIX Timer Bug Fix**
Okay, let's dive into commit `d2710c8d938a`. My immediate focus is on the change within the `posixtimer_get_target` function. Specifically, it seems like a condition check for `!current->exit_state` has been replaced with `!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)`. This piques my interest—why this change? What's the underlying reason for checking either of these in the first place?
Let's refresh our understanding of what `posixtimer_get_target` does. Reading the associated comment, this function is responsible for determining the target task to receive a POSIX timer signal. The comment clarifies that when the signal type isn't thread-specific (`PIDTYPE_PID`), the signal should ideally go to the process. The code aims to prefer `current` if it's within the same thread group as the target and its signal handler is stable. This optimization avoids waking up an idle task unnecessarily.
Now the critical part: This function is called from `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()`, and it's essential that the returned `task_struct` is valid. I'm especially interested in the context of the call; where is this function getting invoked from? I remember that `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` is called from `posix_timer_fn`, and this function runs in `hrtimer_interrupt`, which means hardirq context! This is quite a critical context to be operating in. Let's see what else calls `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` to make sure we understand the full picture. My instinct is that this change must be related to ensuring the safety of this timer signal delivery, perhaps to prevent a race condition or a use-after-free issue when a task is exiting while a timer is set.
|
| 30/2 |
2026/11/18 05:25 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/signal.c IncludeSnippetLines:5 Name:posixtimer_send_sigqueue]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:posix_timer_queue_signal SourceFile:kernel/time/posix-timers.c SourceLine:365 SourceSnippet: 360:
361: if (!posixtimer_valid(timr))
362: return;
363:
364: timr->it_status = timr->it_interval ? POSIX_TIMER_REQUEUE_PENDING : POSIX_TIMER_DISARMED;
365: posixtimer_send_sigqueue(timr);
366: }
]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 31/2 |
2026/11/18 05:25 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 32549
output: 48
thoughts: 31
Thoughts: Here's a summary of my thought process, as requested:
**Tracing the Call Path of `posix_timer_queue_signal`**
Okay, so `posix_timer_queue_signal`... where *is* that function called from? I need to understand its entry points to fully grasp its behavior within the system. Let's get right to it. Time to check the cross-references. That's the first step - a quick grep or IDE search, depending on the codebase, will immediately reveal all the locations where `posix_timer_queue_signal` is invoked. Knowing the call sites is absolutely crucial. From those locations, I can then map out the execution flow and how it connects to the system. Knowing the upstream path will provide me the necessary context.
|
| 32/2 |
2026/11/18 05:27 |
tool |
codesearch-find-references |
0m
Args: map[ContextFile:kernel/time/posix-timers.c IncludeSnippetLines:5 Name:posix_timer_queue_signal]
Results: map[References:[map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:__posixtimer_deliver_signal SourceFile:kernel/time/posix-timers.c SourceLine:327 SourceSnippet: 322: info->si_overrun = timer_overrun_to_int(timr);
323:
324: if (queued)
325: timr->it_status = POSIX_TIMER_ARMED;
326: else
327: posix_timer_queue_signal(timr);
328: return true;
329: }
] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:alarm_handle_timer SourceFile:kernel/time/alarmtimer.c SourceLine:505 SourceSnippet: 500: static void alarm_handle_timer(struct alarm *alarm, ktime_t now)
501: {
502: struct k_itimer *ptr = container_of(alarm, struct k_itimer, it.alarm.alarmtimer);
503:
504: guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&ptr->it_lock);
505: posix_timer_queue_signal(ptr);
506: }
] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:common_timer_set SourceFile:kernel/time/posix-timers.c SourceLine:921 SourceSnippet: 916: * signal delivery code.
917: */
918: timr->it_status = POSIX_TIMER_ARMED;
919: } else {
920: /* Timer was already expired, queue the signal */
921: posix_timer_queue_signal(timr);
922: }
923: return 0;
924: }
] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:cpu_timer_fire SourceFile:kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c SourceLine:773 SourceSnippet: 768: * not a normal timer from sys_timer_create.
769: */
770: wake_up_process(timer->it_process);
771: cpu_timer_setexpires(ctmr, 0);
772: } else {
773: posix_timer_queue_signal(timer);
774: /* Disable oneshot timers */
775: if (!timer->it_interval)
776: cpu_timer_setexpires(ctmr, 0);
777: }
778: }
] map[ReferenceKind:calls ReferencingEntityKind:function ReferencingEntityName:posix_timer_fn SourceFile:kernel/time/posix-timers.c SourceLine:380 SourceSnippet: 375: static enum hrtimer_restart posix_timer_fn(struct hrtimer *timer)
376: {
377: struct k_itimer *timr = container_of(timer, struct k_itimer, it.real.timer);
378:
379: guard(spinlock_irqsave)(&timr->it_lock);
380: posix_timer_queue_signal(timr);
381: return HRTIMER_NORESTART;
382: }
]] TruncatedOutput:false]
|
| 33/2 |
2026/11/18 05:27 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 33755
output: 28
thoughts: 1264
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential Race Condition in Posix Timer Signal Delivery**
Okay, let's break this down. We've got a scenario where `posix_timer_queue_signal` can be triggered from either an interrupt context (hrtimer, alarmtimer) or a process context (`common_timer_set`, `posixtimer_deliver_signal`). The KCSAN report is showing a specific situation: CPU 0 is running a process, specifically task 12250, which is currently executing `sys_acct`.
Within `sys_acct`, specifically inside the `capable()` function and `ns_capable_common()`, we have the line `current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;`. That's a read-modify-write operation on `current->flags`! The KCSAN report indicates that around this very moment, a watchpoint is triggered on `current->flags`. This suggests a potential concurrent modification.
Crucially, an interrupt occurs on the *same* CPU 0 while task 12250 is in the middle of this flag modification. This interrupt chain goes: `local_apic_timer_interrupt` -> `hrtimer_interrupt` -> `__hrtimer_run_queues` -> `__run_hrtimer` -> `posix_timer_fn` -> `posix_timer_queue_signal` -> `posixtimer_send_sigqueue` -> `posixtimer_get_target`.
Now, the critical part: `posixtimer_get_target`. The code snippet shows:
My immediate thought is: Can `posixtimer_get_target` potentially run concurrently on *another* CPU? The report mentions a timer expiring on CPU 1 while task 12250 (on CPU 0) is running. If `hrtimer` expires on CPU 1, `posixtimer_get_target` could be invoked there. In that scenario, `current` would refer to whatever task is *currently* running on CPU 1.
Then I realized something: `same_thread_group(t, current)` checks if `current` (on CPU 1) is in the same thread group as `t`. If another thread of the same process is running on CPU 1, then the `current` variable on CPU 1 is *that* other thread! This means `current->flags` in `posixtimer_get_target` is reading the flags of the task running on CPU 1, *not necessarily* the task that the timer was initially associated with.
I double-checked line 2027: `same_thread_group(t, current) && !(current->flags & PF_EXITING)`. Yes, it's accessing `current->flags`. It's reading the flags of the *current* task on the CPU executing the function, which in this interrupt context, will be the interrupted task.
Now, in the context of the KCSAN report, task 12250 is running on CPU 0. The interrupt occurs on CPU 0. The `current` inside the interrupt handler IS task 12250, which was interrupted while modifying its `flags` within `capable()`. Can this interrupt even happen? Yes! `sys_acct` and `capable` run with interrupts *enabled*. So the timer interrupt *can* interrupt task 12250 while it's modifying its flags.
I was next asking, does `posix_timer_fn` ever WRITE to `current->flags`? No. The code shows that the access of `current->flags` in `posixtimer_get_target` is *read* only. However, this raises the question if a modification of `current->flags` could occur at the same time. The issue appears in the context of C when an interrupt reads a variable which is concurrently modified by the interrupted code.
The question I have now: Is `task_struct::flags` private to a task? Can another task read or write those flags? I need to verify how and where `tsk->flags` is accessed in the kernel. This is where I need to dig into the kernel's code to determine
|
| 34/2 |
2026/11/18 05:28 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:->flags.*PF_ PathPrefixes:[kernel/]]
Results: map[Output:
Full output is too long, showing 200 out of 1027 lines.
Use more precise expression or PathPrefixes if possible.
Number of matching lines per file (56 files in total):
kernel/acct.c:4
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:5
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:5
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:2
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:18
kernel/capability.c:1
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:1
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:8
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:2
kernel/cgroup/freezer.c:2
kernel/events/core.c:3
kernel/events/uprobes.c:1
kernel/exit.c:5
kernel/fork.c:12
kernel/freezer.c:4
kernel/futex/pi.c:3
kernel/hung_task.c:1
kernel/irq/handle.c:1
kernel/irq/manage.c:1
kernel/kthread.c:11
kernel/livepatch/transition.c:1
kernel/pid.c:2
kernel/power/main.c:2
kernel/power/process.c:5
kernel/ptrace.c:4
kernel/rcu/rcuscale.c:1
kernel/rcu/tree.c:2
kernel/reboot.c:1
kernel/rseq.c:1
kernel/sched/autogroup.c:1
kernel/sched/core.c:12
kernel/sched/cputime.c:5
kernel/sched/ext/ext.c:1
kernel/sched/ext/idle.c:1
kernel/sched/fair.c:11
kernel/sched/idle.c:5
kernel/sched/psi.c:1
kernel/sched/sched.h:2
kernel/sched/syscalls.c:1
kernel/seccomp.c:3
kernel/signal.c:11
kernel/softirq.c:1
kernel/stacktrace.c:1
kernel/sys.c:9
kernel/task_work.c:1
kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c:4
kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c:2
kernel/trace/rv/monitors/sleep/sleep.c:1
kernel/trace/rv/monitors/wakeup/wakeup.c:1
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c:2
... and 6 more files
kernel/acct.c=557=void acct_collect(long exitcode, int group_dead)
--
kernel/acct.c-578- pacct->ac_exitcode = exitcode;
kernel/acct.c:579: if (current->flags & PF_FORKNOEXEC)
kernel/acct.c-580- pacct->ac_flag |= AFORK;
kernel/acct.c-581- }
kernel/acct.c:582: if (current->flags & PF_SUPERPRIV)
kernel/acct.c-583- pacct->ac_flag |= ASU;
kernel/acct.c:584: if (current->flags & PF_DUMPCORE)
kernel/acct.c-585- pacct->ac_flag |= ACORE;
kernel/acct.c:586: if (current->flags & PF_SIGNALED)
kernel/acct.c-587- pacct->ac_flag |= AXSIG;
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c=560=static u32 prog_list_length(struct hlist_head *head, int *preorder_cnt)
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-567- continue;
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:568: if (preorder_cnt && (pl->flags & BPF_F_PREORDER))
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-569- (*preorder_cnt)++;
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c=608=static int compute_effective_progs(struct cgroup *cgrp,
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-642-
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:643: if (pl->flags & BPF_F_PREORDER) {
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-644- item = &progs->items[bstart];
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c=856=static struct bpf_prog_list *get_prog_list(struct hlist_head *progs, struct bpf_prog *prog,
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-907- (anchor_link && anchor_link == &pltmp->link->link)) {
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:908: if (!!(pltmp->flags & BPF_F_PREORDER) != preorder)
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-909- goto out;
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c=1103=static int effective_prog_pos(struct cgroup *cgrp,
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-1132- */
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1133: if (pl->flags & BPF_F_PREORDER) {
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-1134- if (pl == target_pl)
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c=1431=static int __cgroup_bpf_query(struct cgroup *cgrp, const union bpf_attr *attr,
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-1522- flags = cgrp->bpf.flags[atype] |
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c:1523: (pl->flags & BPF_F_PREORDER);
kernel/bpf/cgroup.c-1524- if (copy_to_user(prog_attach_flags + i,
--
kernel/bpf/syscall.c=1805=static int map_lookup_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
--
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-1823-
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1824: err = bpf_map_check_op_flags(map, attr->flags, BPF_F_LOCK | BPF_F_CPU);
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-1825- if (err)
--
kernel/bpf/syscall.c=2235=static int map_lookup_and_delete_elem(union bpf_attr *attr)
--
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-2246-
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2247: if (attr->flags & ~BPF_F_LOCK)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-2248- return -EINVAL;
--
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-2267-
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:2268: if ((attr->flags & BPF_F_LOCK) &&
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-2269- !btf_record_has_field(map->record, BPF_SPIN_LOCK)) {
--
kernel/bpf/syscall.c=3446=static void bpf_link_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
--
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-3455- if (link->type == BPF_LINK_TYPE_KPROBE_MULTI)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3456: seq_printf(m, "link_type:\t%s\n", link->flags == BPF_F_KPROBE_MULTI_RETURN ?
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-3457- "kretprobe_multi" : "kprobe_multi");
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-3458- else if (link->type == BPF_LINK_TYPE_UPROBE_MULTI)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3459: seq_printf(m, "link_type:\t%s\n", link->flags & BPF_F_UPROBE_MULTI_RETURN ?
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-3460- "uretprobe_multi" : "uprobe_multi");
--
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c=757=BPF_CALL_5(bpf_find_vma, struct task_struct *, task, u64, start,
--
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c-786- mm = task->mm;
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:787: if (mm && !(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c-788- mmget(mm);
--
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c=873=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_task_vma_new(struct bpf_iter_task_vma *it,
--
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c-921- kit->data->mm = task->mm;
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:922: if (kit->data->mm && !(task->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c-923- mmget(kit->data->mm);
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c=98=static int bpf_tramp_ftrace_ops_func(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned long ip,
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-118- */
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:119: if ((tr->flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG) &&
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:120: !(tr->flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_ORIG_STACK)) {
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:121: if (WARN_ON_ONCE(tr->flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY))
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-122- return -EBUSY;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-123-
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:124: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-125- return -EAGAIN;
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-152- case FTRACE_OPS_CMD_ENABLE_SHARE_IPMODIFY_PEER:
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:153: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-154-
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:155: if ((tr->flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG) &&
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:156: !(tr->flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_ORIG_STACK))
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-157- ret = bpf_trampoline_update(tr, false /* lock_direct_mutex */,
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-160- case FTRACE_OPS_CMD_DISABLE_SHARE_IPMODIFY_PEER:
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:161: tr->flags &= ~BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-162-
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:163: if (tr->flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_ORIG_STACK)
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-164- ret = bpf_trampoline_update(tr, false /* lock_direct_mutex */,
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c=712=static int bpf_trampoline_update(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, bool lock_direct_mutex,
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-730- /* clear all bits except SHARE_IPMODIFY and TAIL_CALL_CTX */
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:731: tr->flags &= (BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY | BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX);
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-732-
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-737- */
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:738: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG | BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-739- } else {
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:740: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_RESTORE_REGS;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-741- }
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-743- if (ip_arg)
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:744: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_IP_ARG;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-745-
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-747-again:
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:748: if (tr->flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG) {
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:749: if (tr->flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY) {
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-750- /* The BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME can be cleared in the
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-752- */
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:753: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_ORIG_STACK | BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-754- } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_JMP)) {
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-758- */
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:759: tr->flags &= ~BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-760- }
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-780- }
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:781: im->call_orig = tr->flags & BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-782-
--
kernel/capability.c=330=static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns,
--
kernel/capability.c-342- if (capable == 0) {
kernel/capability.c:343: current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
kernel/capability.c-344- return true;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c=104=int cgroup_transfer_tasks(struct cgroup *to, struct cgroup *from)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-141- task = css_task_iter_next(&it);
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:142: } while (task && (task->flags & PF_EXITING));
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-143-
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=882=static void css_set_move_task(struct task_struct *task,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-908- */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:909: WARN_ON_ONCE(task->flags & PF_EXITING);
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-910-
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=2596=static void cgroup_migrate_add_task(struct task_struct *task,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2603- /* @task either already exited or can't exit until the end */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2604: if (task->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2605- return;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=3127=struct task_struct *cgroup_procs_write_start(char *buf, bool threadgroup,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-3156- */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:3157: if (tsk->no_cgroup_migration || (tsk->flags & PF_NO_SETAFFINITY)) {
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-3158- tsk = ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=4295=static void __cgroup_kill(struct cgroup *cgrp)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4308- /* Ignore kernel threads here. */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4309: if (task->flags & PF_KTHREAD)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4310- continue;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=5203=static void css_task_iter_advance(struct css_task_iter *it)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5244- if (!(it->flags & CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD) &&
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5245: (task->flags & PF_EXITING) && !atomic_read(&task->signal->live))
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5246- goto repeat;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=6758=int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-6804- */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:6805: if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(tsk->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-6806- retval = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=7122=void cgroup_post_fork(struct task_struct *child,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-7155-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:7156: if (!(child->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-7157- if (unlikely(test_bit(CGRP_FREEZE, &cgrp_flags))) {
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=7230=static void do_cgroup_task_dead(struct task_struct *tsk)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-7248- WARN_ON_ONCE(cgroup_task_frozen(tsk));
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:7249: if (unlikely(!(tsk->flags & PF_KTHREAD) &&
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-7250- test_bit(CGRP_FREEZE, &task_dfl_cgroup(tsk)->flags)))
--
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c=1112=void cpuset_update_tasks_cpumask(struct cpuset *cs, struct cpumask *new_cpus)
--
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c-1126- */
]
|
| 35/2 |
2026/11/18 05:28 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 40909
output: 18
thoughts: 26
Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my summary, taking on the persona you requested:
**Deconstructing `PF_SUPERPRIV` in Kernel Context**
Alright, I'm thinking about `PF_SUPERPRIV` in the kernel. This flag… what's it about again? I need to jog my memory and see where it actually surfaces in the codebase. My first thought is: *Where* is this flag being used? What functions or data structures are actually *checking* for `PF_SUPERPRIV`? I need to trace its usage to understand its implications for system behavior and security. I should start by searching for all instances of it to understand how it's being used.
|
| 36/2 |
2026/11/18 05:28 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:PF_SUPERPRIV]
Results: map[Output:include/linux/sched.h=1798=extern struct pid __rcu *cad_pid;
--
include/linux/sched.h-1810-#define PF_MCE_PROCESS 0x00000080 /* Process policy on mce errors */
include/linux/sched.h:1811:#define PF_SUPERPRIV 0x00000100 /* Used super-user privileges */
include/linux/sched.h-1812-#define PF_DUMPCORE 0x00000200 /* Dumped core */
--
kernel/acct.c=557=void acct_collect(long exitcode, int group_dead)
--
kernel/acct.c-581- }
kernel/acct.c:582: if (current->flags & PF_SUPERPRIV)
kernel/acct.c-583- pacct->ac_flag |= ASU;
--
kernel/capability.c=216=SYSCALL_DEFINE2(capset, cap_user_header_t, header, const cap_user_data_t, data)
--
kernel/capability.c-273- *
kernel/capability.c:274: * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
kernel/capability.c-275- */
kernel/capability.c=276=bool has_ns_capability(struct task_struct *t,
--
kernel/capability.c-298- *
kernel/capability.c:299: * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
kernel/capability.c-300- */
kernel/capability.c=301=bool has_ns_capability_noaudit(struct task_struct *t,
--
kernel/capability.c-322- *
kernel/capability.c:323: * Note that this does not set PF_SUPERPRIV on the task.
kernel/capability.c-324- */
--
kernel/capability.c=330=static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns,
--
kernel/capability.c-342- if (capable == 0) {
kernel/capability.c:343: current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
kernel/capability.c-344- return true;
--
kernel/capability.c-356- *
kernel/capability.c:357: * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
kernel/capability.c-358- * assumption that it's about to be used.
--
kernel/capability.c=364=EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable);
--
kernel/capability.c-374- *
kernel/capability.c:375: * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
kernel/capability.c-376- * assumption that it's about to be used.
--
kernel/capability.c=382=EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_noaudit);
--
kernel/capability.c-393- *
kernel/capability.c:394: * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
kernel/capability.c-395- * assumption that it's about to be used.
--
kernel/capability.c=401=EXPORT_SYMBOL(ns_capable_setid);
--
kernel/capability.c-409- *
kernel/capability.c:410: * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
kernel/capability.c-411- * assumption that it's about to be used.
--
kernel/capability.c=417=EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable);
--
kernel/capability.c-427- *
kernel/capability.c:428: * This sets PF_SUPERPRIV on the task if the capability is available on the
kernel/capability.c-429- * assumption that it's about to be used.
--
kernel/capability.c=435=EXPORT_SYMBOL(capable_noaudit);
--
kernel/capability.c-446- *
kernel/capability.c:447: * This does not set PF_SUPERPRIV because the caller may not
kernel/capability.c-448- * actually be privileged.
--
kernel/fork.c=2029=__latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
--
kernel/fork.c-2209- delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
kernel/fork.c:2210: p->flags &= ~(PF_SUPERPRIV | PF_WQ_WORKER | PF_IDLE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
kernel/fork.c-2211- p->flags |= PF_FORKNOEXEC;
--
kernel/tsacct.c=20=void bacct_add_tsk(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
--
kernel/tsacct.c-51- stats->ac_flag |= AFORK;
kernel/tsacct.c:52: if (tsk->flags & PF_SUPERPRIV)
kernel/tsacct.c-53- stats->ac_flag |= ASU;
--
security/commoncap.c=1469=int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr)
--
security/commoncap.c-1475- CAP_OPT_NONE);
security/commoncap.c:1476: /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */
security/commoncap.c-1477- if (ret == 0)
security/commoncap.c:1478: current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
security/commoncap.c-1479- }
]
|
| 37/2 |
2026/11/18 05:28 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 42545
output: 34
thoughts: 810
Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential Race Condition in the POSIX Timer Implementation**
Okay, so I'm digging into this KCSAN report. The core issue seems to revolve around concurrent access to `current->flags` within the POSIX timer implementation. Let's break this down systematically.
First, I see `PF_SUPERPRIV` is being set, and it's used for accounting purposes. Specifically, `acct_collect` sets an accounting flag, and `bacct_add_tsk` also sets another accounting flag related to superuser privileges. Interestingly, a `PF_SUPERPRIV` flag is also set directly using `current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;` which sets bit 0x100. Alright, noted.
Now, the KCSAN report pinpoints `posixtimer_get_target`, so I'm going to look at that function carefully. It's used to determine which task should receive a signal from a POSIX timer. My initial reading tells me that if the target task `t` is in the same thread group as the currently running task `current`, and `current` isn't exiting, then `current` is preferred to receive the signal. The reasoning here is pretty clear: it avoids unnecessarily waking up an idle task by targeting the task that's already running. Seems like a decent optimization, aiming for efficiency.
Here's where it gets interesting, and where the race condition is suggested. The `current->flags` variable is being read in the interrupt handler, right? So, in this scenario, while a task (let's say 12250) on CPU 0 is executing `capable()`, setting `current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;` (a read-modify-write operation), a timer interrupt arrives on *the same CPU*. The interrupt handler executes, calls `posix_timer_fn`, which eventually calls `posixtimer_get_target`. And inside `posixtimer_get_target`, it reads `current->flags`! The KCSAN report flags this because it sees a read and a write happening simultaneously to `current->flags` on the same CPU. I think that's the gist of it.
But... wait... can this happen across CPUs? I need to clarify if `posixtimer_get_target` could access *another* task's flags. Let me check the code. Looking at `posixtimer_get_target`: I can see that `t` comes from `pid_task`. The function only reads `current->flags`, it doesn't read `t->flags`. So it looks like it can't happen across CPUs and KCSAN isn't flagging it.
Ok, so it sounds like the race condition is possible only on a single CPU, with a concurrent read from the timer handler and a write from a task at the same CPU, so the KCSAN is correct in this situation.
Now, let me check `posixtimer_send_sigqueue` in `kernel/signal.c` to be completely thorough. I need to make sure nothing else there touches flags.
|
| 38/2 |
2026/11/18 05:29 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/signal.c FirstLine:2050 LineCount:40]
Results: map[Contents:2050: struct task_struct *t;
2051: unsigned long flags;
2052: int result;
2053:
2054: guard(rcu)();
2055:
2056: t = posixtimer_get_target(tmr);
2057: if (!t)
2058: return;
2059:
2060: if (!likely(lock_task_sighand(t, &flags)))
2061: return;
2062:
2063: if (!task_can_queue_signal(t, tmr->it_pid_type))
2064: goto unlock;
2065:
2066: /*
2067: * Update @tmr::sigqueue_seq for posix timer signals with sighand
2068: * locked to prevent a race against dequeue_signal().
2069: */
2070: tmr->it_sigqueue_seq = tmr->it_signal_seq;
2071:
2072: /*
2073: * Set the signal delivery status under sighand lock, so that the
2074: * ignored signal handling can distinguish between a periodic and a
2075: * non-periodic timer.
2076: */
2077: tmr->it_sig_periodic = tmr->it_status == POSIX_TIMER_REQUEUE_PENDING;
2078:
2079: if (!prepare_signal(sig, t, false)) {
2080: result = TRACE_SIGNAL_IGNORED;
2081:
2082: if (!list_empty(&q->list)) {
2083: /*
2084: * The signal was ignored and blocked. The timer
2085: * expiry queued it because blocked signals are
2086: * queued independent of the ignored state.
2087: *
2088: * The unblocking set SIGPENDING, but the signal
2089: * was not yet dequeued from the pending list.
]
|
| 39/2 |
2026/11/18 05:29 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 44627
output: 44
thoughts: 3900
Thoughts: **Analysis of a Potential Data Race in `posixtimer_send_sigqueue`**
Alright, let's break this down. The KCSAN report flagged a potential data race on `current->flags` in the context of `posixtimer_send_sigqueue`, specifically around the `!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)` check in `posixtimer_get_target`. The KCSAN report pointed to a write to `current->flags` via the `|= PF_SUPERPRIV` in `ns_capable_common`, and a read in the interrupt handler which calls `posixtimer_get_target`.
My initial thought was, "Can this read/write even conflict?" Looking at the assembly, the `|=` operation without a `LOCK` prefix is concerning. It's a non-atomic RMW (read-modify-write). But, the interrupt handler only *reads* `current->flags`, it doesn't *write* to it, so this concern isn't applicable. Interrupt handlers don't write to `current->flags` at all. The kernel, for the most part, only modifies `current->flags` in task context (e.g. `set_current_state`, or setting `PF_*` flags by the task itself, or in `fork`/`exit`).
However, I immediately thought, could there be a torn read due to the non-atomic nature of the x86 `orl` instruction if an interrupt occurs in the middle? But, since `flags` is an aligned 32-bit integer, and both read and write are the same size, it can never tear. So this isn't a problem. Either the old or new value is valid and safe.
The next thing I noticed was the `PF_EXITING` bit. This is the crucial bit. The relevant line only checks `PF_EXITING`, and only *reads* this bit. `PF_SUPERPRIV` is totally irrelevant to the logic. Whether `PF_SUPERPRIV` is set or not, `current->flags & PF_EXITING` will evaluate to the same result. The fact that the code is changing `PF_SUPERPRIV` is totally orthogonal to the read.
Then I realized that `posixtimer_get_target` is a heuristic. It's *trying* to avoid waking an idle thread by checking if the current thread group is the same and if the target isn't exiting. But it's only an *optimization*. Critically, the signal delivery is *still* to the process, not the thread, if the timer is a process timer (i.e. `tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID`).
The crucial realization is that if `PF_EXITING` is *already* set, `posixtimer_get_target` won't choose current, avoiding an exiting task. If `PF_EXITING` isn't yet set, `current` might be chosen. However, the `task_can_queue_signal` function, *also* called in `posixtimer_send_sigqueue`, acquires the same lock (`sighand->siglock`) that's held by `exit_signals()` when setting `PF_EXITING`. Therefore, the signal handling code is *correctly* synchronized via the lock.
It all points to a *benign* race. The code is structured in a way where a stale read of `current->flags` *doesn't* introduce a bug or corruption. The check `!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)` is just a hint that's safe to be a bit stale in this context, because of the subsequent synchronization in `task_can_queue_signal()`. It looks like the KCSAN report is flagging a potentially misleading race that isn't really a problem.
|
| 40/2 |
2026/11/18 05:30 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:(->flags\s*[|^&=+-]=|\.flags\s*[|^&=+-]=) PathPrefixes:[kernel/]]
Results: map[Output:
Full output is too long, showing 200 out of 2140 lines.
Use more precise expression or PathPrefixes if possible.
Number of matching lines per file (66 files in total):
kernel/auditfilter.c:1
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c:1
kernel/bpf/btf.c:1
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:2
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:1
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:10
kernel/capability.c:1
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:5
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:37
kernel/exit.c:2
kernel/fork.c:9
kernel/freezer.c:1
kernel/futex/pi.c:1
kernel/irq/ipi-mux.c:1
kernel/irq/irqdomain.c:8
kernel/irq/manage.c:5
kernel/kprobes.c:21
kernel/kthread.c:2
kernel/locking/percpu-rwsem.c:1
kernel/padata.c:6
kernel/power/energy_model.c:2
kernel/power/main.c:2
kernel/power/process.c:2
kernel/printk/braille.c:1
kernel/printk/printk.c:9
kernel/rcu/rcuscale.c:1
kernel/reboot.c:1
kernel/resource.c:4
kernel/sched/core.c:5
kernel/sched/cputime.c:2
kernel/sched/ext/ext.c:72
kernel/sched/ext/idle.c:1
kernel/sched/ext/internal.h:1
kernel/sched/ext/sub.c:24
kernel/sched/fair.c:10
kernel/sched/idle.c:3
kernel/sched/isolation.c:1
kernel/sched/syscalls.c:3
kernel/sched/topology.c:5
kernel/sched/wait.c:11
kernel/seccomp.c:1
kernel/signal.c:4
kernel/softirq.c:1
kernel/sys.c:9
kernel/time/clocksource-wdtest.c:1
kernel/time/clocksource.c:12
kernel/time/tick-sched.c:2
kernel/time/timer.c:6
kernel/trace/fgraph.c:3
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:64
... and 16 more files
kernel/auditfilter.c=971=static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
--
kernel/auditfilter.c-1024- list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list);
kernel/auditfilter.c:1025: entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
kernel/auditfilter.c-1026- } else {
--
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c=11=int bpf_push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
--
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c-27- env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->flags, insn_flags);
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c:28: env->cur_hist_ent->flags |= insn_flags;
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c-29- env->cur_hist_ent->spi = spi;
--
kernel/bpf/btf.c=9433=static int btf_module_notify(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long op,
--
kernel/bpf/btf.c-9528-
kernel/bpf/btf.c:9529: btf_mod->flags |= BTF_MODULE_F_LIVE;
kernel/bpf/btf.c-9530- break;
--
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c=322=static long trie_update_elem(struct bpf_map *map,
--
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c-430- im_node->prefixlen = matchlen;
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:431: im_node->flags |= LPM_TREE_NODE_FLAG_IM;
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c-432- memcpy(im_node->data, node->data, trie->data_size);
--
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c=457=static long trie_delete_elem(struct bpf_map *map, void *_key)
--
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c-511- rcu_access_pointer(node->child[1])) {
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c:512: node->flags |= LPM_TREE_NODE_FLAG_IM;
kernel/bpf/lpm_trie.c-513- goto out;
--
kernel/bpf/syscall.c=3446=static void bpf_link_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *filp)
--
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-3455- if (link->type == BPF_LINK_TYPE_KPROBE_MULTI)
kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3456: seq_printf(m, "link_type:\t%s\n", link->flags == BPF_F_KPROBE_MULTI_RETURN ?
kernel/bpf/syscall.c-3457- "kretprobe_multi" : "kprobe_multi");
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c=98=static int bpf_tramp_ftrace_ops_func(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned long ip,
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-123-
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:124: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-125- return -EAGAIN;
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-152- case FTRACE_OPS_CMD_ENABLE_SHARE_IPMODIFY_PEER:
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:153: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-154-
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-160- case FTRACE_OPS_CMD_DISABLE_SHARE_IPMODIFY_PEER:
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:161: tr->flags &= ~BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-162-
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c=705=void bpf_trampoline_set_flags(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, u32 flags)
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-707- trampoline_lock(tr);
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:708: tr->flags |= flags;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-709- trampoline_unlock(tr);
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c=712=static int bpf_trampoline_update(struct bpf_trampoline *tr, bool lock_direct_mutex,
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-730- /* clear all bits except SHARE_IPMODIFY and TAIL_CALL_CTX */
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:731: tr->flags &= (BPF_TRAMP_F_SHARE_IPMODIFY | BPF_TRAMP_F_TAIL_CALL_CTX);
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-732-
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-737- */
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:738: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_CALL_ORIG | BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-739- } else {
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:740: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_RESTORE_REGS;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-741- }
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-743- if (ip_arg)
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:744: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_IP_ARG;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-745-
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-752- */
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:753: tr->flags |= BPF_TRAMP_F_ORIG_STACK | BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-754- } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_JMP)) {
--
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-758- */
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c:759: tr->flags &= ~BPF_TRAMP_F_SKIP_FRAME;
kernel/bpf/trampoline.c-760- }
--
kernel/capability.c=330=static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns,
--
kernel/capability.c-342- if (capable == 0) {
kernel/capability.c:343: current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
kernel/capability.c-344- return true;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c=935=int cgroup1_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-972- case Opt_noprefix:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:973: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NOPREFIX;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-974- break;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-978- case Opt_cpuset_v2_mode:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:979: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_CPUSET_V2_MODE;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-980- break;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-981- case Opt_xattr:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:982: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_XATTR;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-983- break;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-984- case Opt_favordynmods:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:985: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_FAVOR_DYNMODS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-986- break;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-987- case Opt_nofavordynmods:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:988: ctx->flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_FAVOR_DYNMODS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-989- break;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=1302=void cgroup_favor_dynmods(struct cgroup_root *root, bool favor)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1321- rcu_sync_enter(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem.rss);
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:1322: root->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_FAVOR_DYNMODS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1323- } else if (!favor && favoring) {
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1326- rcu_sync_exit(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem.rss);
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:1327: root->flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_FAVOR_DYNMODS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1328- }
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=1747=static void css_clear_dir(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1754-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:1755: css->flags &= ~CSS_VISIBLE;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1756-
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=1780=static int css_populate_dir(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1820-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:1821: css->flags |= CSS_VISIBLE;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1822-
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=1998=static int cgroup2_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2009- case Opt_nsdelegate:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2010: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2011- return 0;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2012- case Opt_favordynmods:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2013: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_FAVOR_DYNMODS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2014- return 0;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2015- case Opt_memory_localevents:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2016: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_LOCAL_EVENTS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2017- return 0;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2018- case Opt_memory_recursiveprot:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2019: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_RECURSIVE_PROT;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2020- return 0;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2021- case Opt_memory_hugetlb_accounting:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2022: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_HUGETLB_ACCOUNTING;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2023- return 0;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2024- case Opt_pids_localevents:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2025: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_PIDS_LOCAL_EVENTS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2026- return 0;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=2038=static void apply_cgroup_root_flags(unsigned int root_flags)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2041- if (root_flags & CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2042: cgrp_dfl_root.flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2043- else
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2044: cgrp_dfl_root.flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_NS_DELEGATE;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2045-
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2049- if (root_flags & CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_LOCAL_EVENTS)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2050: cgrp_dfl_root.flags |= CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_LOCAL_EVENTS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2051- else
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2052: cgrp_dfl_root.flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_LOCAL_EVENTS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2053-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2054- if (root_flags & CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_RECURSIVE_PROT)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2055: cgrp_dfl_root.flags |= CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_RECURSIVE_PROT;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2056- else
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2057: cgrp_dfl_root.flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_RECURSIVE_PROT;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2058-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2059- if (root_flags & CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_HUGETLB_ACCOUNTING)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2060: cgrp_dfl_root.flags |= CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_HUGETLB_ACCOUNTING;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2061- else
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2062: cgrp_dfl_root.flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_MEMORY_HUGETLB_ACCOUNTING;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2063-
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2064- if (root_flags & CGRP_ROOT_PIDS_LOCAL_EVENTS)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2065: cgrp_dfl_root.flags |= CGRP_ROOT_PIDS_LOCAL_EVENTS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2066- else
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2067: cgrp_dfl_root.flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_PIDS_LOCAL_EVENTS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2068- }
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=2096=static void init_cgroup_housekeeping(struct cgroup *cgrp)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2106- cgrp->self.cgroup = cgrp;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2107: cgrp->self.flags |= CSS_ONLINE;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2108- cgrp->dom_cgrp = cgrp;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=2354=static int cgroup_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2373- if (have_favordynmods)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2374: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_FAVOR_DYNMODS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2375-
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=2423=static int cpuset_parse_param(struct fs_context *fc, struct fs_parameter *param)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2434- case Opt_cpuset_v2_mode:
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2435: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_CPUSET_V2_MODE;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2436- return 0;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=2452=static int cpuset_init_fs_context(struct fs_context *fc)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2467- ctx->subsys_mask = 1 << cpuset_cgrp_id;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2468: ctx->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_NOPREFIX;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2469- ctx->release_agent = agent;
]
|
| 41/2 |
2026/11/18 05:30 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 54488
output: 40
thoughts: 38
Thoughts: Here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience:
**Targeting Task Flags for Analysis**
Okay, so I'm thinking, instead of a broad search, let's hone in on something specific. I'm going to focus my investigation on writes that modify the `flags` field of the `task_struct`. Given its critical role in process state management, it's a prime target for potential exploits or unexpected behaviors. I'll need to expand my search query to include common references like `p->flags`, `tsk->flags`, `current->flags`, and `t->flags`, since these are all frequently used aliases or accesses to the same critical `task_struct` member. I'm aiming to pinpoint any instance where the bitwise OR operation is used to modify these flags, as that often indicates a subtle change in process state that might be exploitable.
|
| 42/2 |
2026/11/18 05:30 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:(p|tsk|current|t)->flags\s*[|^&]?= PathPrefixes:[kernel/]]
Results: map[Output:
Full output is too long, showing 200 out of 444 lines.
Use more precise expression or PathPrefixes if possible.
Number of matching lines per file (31 files in total):
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c:2
kernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c:1
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:1
kernel/capability.c:1
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:10
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c:1
kernel/events/core.c:1
kernel/exit.c:1
kernel/fork.c:8
kernel/freezer.c:1
kernel/futex/pi.c:1
kernel/kprobes.c:18
kernel/kthread.c:2
kernel/nsproxy.c:1
kernel/padata.c:6
kernel/power/main.c:2
kernel/power/process.c:1
kernel/rcu/rcuscale.c:1
kernel/reboot.c:1
kernel/sched/core.c:2
kernel/sched/cputime.c:2
kernel/sched/idle.c:3
kernel/sched/topology.c:1
kernel/signal.c:2
kernel/softirq.c:1
kernel/sys.c:9
kernel/trace/ftrace.c:1
kernel/trace/trace.c:3
kernel/trace/trace_osnoise.c:2
kernel/trace/trace_probe.h:1
kernel/workqueue.c:2
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c=11=int bpf_push_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *cur,
--
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c-27- env->insn_idx, env->cur_hist_ent->flags, insn_flags);
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c:28: env->cur_hist_ent->flags |= insn_flags;
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c-29- env->cur_hist_ent->spi = spi;
--
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c-50- p->prev_idx = env->prev_insn_idx;
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c:51: p->flags = insn_flags;
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c-52- p->spi = spi;
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c=322=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_css_new(struct bpf_iter_css *it,
--
kernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c-342- kit->pos = NULL;
kernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c:343: kit->flags = flags;
kernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c-344- return 0;
--
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c=1130=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_task_new(struct bpf_iter_task *it,
--
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1157- kit->pos = kit->task;
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c:1158: kit->flags = flags;
kernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1159- return 0;
--
kernel/capability.c=330=static bool ns_capable_common(struct user_namespace *ns,
--
kernel/capability.c-342- if (capable == 0) {
kernel/capability.c:343: current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;
kernel/capability.c-344- return true;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=1302=void cgroup_favor_dynmods(struct cgroup_root *root, bool favor)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1321- rcu_sync_enter(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem.rss);
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:1322: root->flags |= CGRP_ROOT_FAVOR_DYNMODS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1323- } else if (!favor && favoring) {
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1326- rcu_sync_exit(&cgroup_threadgroup_rwsem.rss);
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:1327: root->flags &= ~CGRP_ROOT_FAVOR_DYNMODS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-1328- }
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=2125=void init_cgroup_root(struct cgroup_fs_context *ctx)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2147- /* DYNMODS must be modified through cgroup_favor_dynmods() */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2148: root->flags = ctx->flags & ~CGRP_ROOT_FAVOR_DYNMODS;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2149- if (ctx->release_agent)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=4628=static void cgroup_exit_cftypes(struct cftype *cfts)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4639- /* revert flags set by cgroup core while adding @cfts */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4640: cft->flags &= ~(__CFTYPE_ONLY_ON_DFL | __CFTYPE_NOT_ON_DFL |
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4641- __CFTYPE_ADDED);
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=4645=static int cgroup_init_cftypes(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cftype *cfts)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4679- cft->ss = ss;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4680: cft->flags |= __CFTYPE_ADDED;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4681- }
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=4769=int cgroup_add_dfl_cftypes(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cftype *cfts)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4773- for (cft = cfts; cft && cft->name[0] != '\0'; cft++)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4774: cft->flags |= __CFTYPE_ONLY_ON_DFL;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4775- return cgroup_add_cftypes(ss, cfts);
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=4786=int cgroup_add_legacy_cftypes(struct cgroup_subsys *ss, struct cftype *cfts)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4790- for (cft = cfts; cft && cft->name[0] != '\0'; cft++)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4791: cft->flags |= __CFTYPE_NOT_ON_DFL;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-4792- return cgroup_add_cftypes(ss, cfts);
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=5192=static void css_task_iter_skip(struct css_task_iter *it,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5198- it->task_pos = it->task_pos->next;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5199: it->flags |= CSS_TASK_ITER_SKIPPED;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5200- }
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=5203=static void css_task_iter_advance(struct css_task_iter *it)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5215- if (it->flags & CSS_TASK_ITER_SKIPPED)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5216: it->flags &= ~CSS_TASK_ITER_SKIPPED;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5217- else
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=5275=void css_task_iter_start(struct cgroup_subsys_state *css, unsigned int flags,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5284- it->ss = css->ss;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5285: it->flags = flags;
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5286-
--
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c=678=static int kdb_defcmd(int argc, const char **argv)
--
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c-717- mp->minlen = 0;
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c:718: mp->flags = KDB_ENABLE_ALWAYS_SAFE;
kernel/debug/kdb/kdb_main.c-719- mp->name = kdb_strdup(argv[1], GFP_KDB);
--
kernel/events/core.c=9923=static void perf_event_mmap_event(struct perf_mmap_event *mmap_event)
--
kernel/events/core.c-10013- mmap_event->prot = prot;
kernel/events/core.c:10014: mmap_event->flags = flags;
kernel/events/core.c-10015-
--
kernel/exit.c=871=static void synchronize_group_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, long code)
--
kernel/exit.c-891- */
kernel/exit.c:892: tsk->flags |= PF_POSTCOREDUMP;
kernel/exit.c-893- core_state = signal->core_state;
--
kernel/fork.c=2029=__latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
--
kernel/fork.c-2160- goto bad_fork_free;
kernel/fork.c:2161: p->flags &= ~PF_KTHREAD;
kernel/fork.c-2162- if (args->kthread)
kernel/fork.c:2163: p->flags |= PF_KTHREAD;
kernel/fork.c-2164- if (args->user_worker) {
kernel/fork.c-2165- /* A user worker takes only the signals nobody can block. */
kernel/fork.c:2166: p->flags |= PF_USER_WORKER;
kernel/fork.c-2167- siginitsetinv(&p->blocked, SIG_KERNEL_ONLY_MASK);
--
kernel/fork.c-2169- if (args->io_thread)
kernel/fork.c:2170: p->flags |= PF_IO_WORKER;
kernel/fork.c-2171-
--
kernel/fork.c-2197- }
kernel/fork.c:2198: current->flags &= ~PF_NPROC_EXCEEDED;
kernel/fork.c-2199-
--
kernel/fork.c-2209- delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
kernel/fork.c:2210: p->flags &= ~(PF_SUPERPRIV | PF_WQ_WORKER | PF_IDLE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
kernel/fork.c:2211: p->flags |= PF_FORKNOEXEC;
kernel/fork.c-2212- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->children);
--
kernel/fork.c-2380- p->plug = NULL;
kernel/fork.c:2381: p->flags &= ~PF_BLOCK_TS;
kernel/fork.c-2382-#endif
--
kernel/freezer.c=232=bool set_freezable(void)
--
kernel/freezer.c-241- spin_lock_irq(&freezer_lock);
kernel/freezer.c:242: current->flags &= ~PF_NOFREEZE;
kernel/freezer.c-243- spin_unlock_irq(&freezer_lock);
--
kernel/futex/pi.c=373=static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval)
--
kernel/futex/pi.c-385- * exit_signals(tsk) No waiters:
kernel/futex/pi.c:386: * tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING; *uaddr == 0x00000PID
kernel/futex/pi.c-387- * mm_release(tsk) Set waiter bit
--
kernel/kprobes.c=1062=static int reuse_unused_kprobe(struct kprobe *ap)
--
kernel/kprobes.c-1076- /* Enable the probe again */
kernel/kprobes.c:1077: ap->flags &= ~KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED;
kernel/kprobes.c-1078- /* Optimize it again. (remove from 'op->list') */
--
kernel/kprobes.c=1607=static void init_aggr_kprobe(struct kprobe *ap, struct kprobe *p)
--
kernel/kprobes.c-1612- ap->addr = p->addr;
kernel/kprobes.c:1613: ap->flags = p->flags & ~KPROBE_FLAG_OPTIMIZED;
kernel/kprobes.c-1614- ap->pre_handler = aggr_pre_handler;
--
kernel/kprobes.c=1629=static int register_aggr_kprobe(struct kprobe *orig_p, struct kprobe *p)
--
kernel/kprobes.c-1676- */
kernel/kprobes.c:1677: ap->flags = (ap->flags & ~KPROBE_FLAG_GONE)
kernel/kprobes.c-1678- | KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED;
--
kernel/kprobes.c-1709- if (arm_kprobe_ftrace(ap))
kernel/kprobes.c:1710: ap->flags |= KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED;
kernel/kprobes.c-1711- return ret;
--
kernel/kprobes.c-1716- if (kprobe_disabled(ap) && !kprobe_disabled(p)) {
kernel/kprobes.c:1717: ap->flags &= ~KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED;
kernel/kprobes.c-1718- if (!kprobes_all_disarmed) {
--
kernel/kprobes.c-1721- if (ret) {
kernel/kprobes.c:1722: ap->flags |= KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED;
kernel/kprobes.c-1723- if (reset_post_handler)
--
kernel/kprobes.c=1907=static int check_ftrace_location(struct kprobe *p)
--
kernel/kprobes.c-1912-#ifdef CONFIG_KPROBES_ON_FTRACE
kernel/kprobes.c:1913: p->flags |= KPROBE_FLAG_FTRACE;
kernel/kprobes.c-1914-#else
--
kernel/kprobes.c=2024=int register_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
--
kernel/kprobes.c-2041- /* User can pass only KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED to register_kprobe */
kernel/kprobes.c:2042: p->flags &= KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED;
kernel/kprobes.c-2043- if (on_func_entry)
kernel/kprobes.c:2044: p->flags |= KPROBE_FLAG_ON_FUNC_ENTRY;
kernel/kprobes.c-2045- p->nmissed = 0;
--
kernel/kprobes.c=2079=static struct kprobe *__disable_kprobe(struct kprobe *p)
--
kernel/kprobes.c-2095- if (p != orig_p)
kernel/kprobes.c:2096: p->flags |= KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED;
kernel/kprobes.c-2097-
--
kernel/kprobes.c-2108- if (ret) {
kernel/kprobes.c:2109: p->flags &= ~KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED;
kernel/kprobes.c-2110- return ERR_PTR(ret);
--
kernel/kprobes.c-2112- }
kernel/kprobes.c:2113: orig_p->flags |= KPROBE_FLAG_DISABLED;
]
|
| 43/2 |
2026/11/18 05:30 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 59123
output: 34
thoughts: 43
Thoughts: Here's my summary, as if I were thinking these thoughts:
**Analyzing Signal Flag Modification in the Kernel**
Okay, time to dive into this. I need to understand how signal flags are being modified within the kernel. My first step is to locate all the relevant code. Let's start with `kernel/signal.c`. That's the logical place to begin. Specifically, I'm focusing on the instances where the `flags` variable is being written to. My intuition tells me that's where I'll find the core logic for signal handling behavior.
Now, to narrow the focus, I'll examine lines 3190 through 3230 in `kernel/signal.c`. That should give me a specific, manageable chunk of code to dissect initially. From there, I can expand the scope as needed, following the data flow and function calls. Let's see what we find in that section.
|
| 44/2 |
2026/11/18 05:30 |
tool |
read-file |
0m
Args: map[File:kernel/signal.c FirstLine:3190 LineCount:40]
Results: map[Contents:3190:
3191: if (!task_sigpending(t))
3192: signal_wake_up(t, 0);
3193:
3194: if (sigisemptyset(&retarget))
3195: break;
3196: }
3197: }
3198:
3199: void exit_signals(struct task_struct *tsk)
3200: {
3201: LIST_HEAD(sigq_list);
3202: int group_stop = 0;
3203:
3204: /*
3205: * @tsk is about to have PF_EXITING set - lock out users which
3206: * expect a stable threadgroup.
3207: */
3208: cgroup_threadgroup_change_begin(tsk);
3209:
3210: scoped_guard(spinlock_irq, &tsk->sighand->siglock) {
3211: tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING;
3212:
3213: sigqueue_dequeue_pending(&tsk->pending, &sigq_list);
3214:
3215: if (task_sigpending(tsk) && !thread_group_empty(tsk) &&
3216: !(tsk->signal->flags & SIGNAL_GROUP_EXIT)) {
3217: sigset_t unblocked = tsk->blocked;
3218:
3219: signotset(&unblocked);
3220: retarget_shared_pending(tsk, &unblocked);
3221:
3222: if (unlikely(tsk->jobctl & JOBCTL_STOP_PENDING) &&
3223: task_participate_group_stop(tsk))
3224: group_stop = CLD_STOPPED;
3225: }
3226: }
3227:
3228: cgroup_threadgroup_change_end(tsk);
3229:
]
|
| 45/2 |
2026/11/18 05:30 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 59958
output: 63
thoughts: 220
Thoughts: **Analyzing Potential Race Conditions in Task Flag Updates**
Okay, so I'm looking at this code and immediately I see something that triggers my spidey-sense: In `exit_signals`, we have `tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING;` protected by a spinlock and IRQs disabled. That's good, that's what I'd expect. But then, I'm thinking about `ns_capable_common` where we see `current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;`. My brain immediately asks, "Is there a *possibility* for another CPU to be writing to `tsk->flags` while the *current* CPU is simultaneously writing to `current->flags`?"
I have to consider this, especially since `exit_signals(tsk)` is called by the task itself as part of its exit process, within `do_exit` and thus eventually `exit_signals(current)`. That's important, as `sys_acct` calling `capable` is also the `current` task. We know a task, obviously, only runs on one CPU at a time. The real question is: can a *different* CPU ever modify a task's flags when that task is currently running on *this* CPU?
This just feels like it's begging for a race condition. I need to make sure this isn't possible, right? The potential for corruption is too great to ignore. Therefore, let's track down ALL uses of `->flags` where the writing task is *not* `current`. Let's get the grep running and see what shows up. I need to be absolutely sure that we've accounted for any potential overlap in memory write operations between these tasks and flags.
|
| 46/2 |
2026/11/18 05:31 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:(tsk|p)->flags\s*[|^&]?= PathPrefixes:[kernel/sched/ kernel/fork.c kernel/exit.c kernel/kthread.c]]
Results: map[Output:kernel/exit.c=871=static void synchronize_group_exit(struct task_struct *tsk, long code)
--
kernel/exit.c-891- */
kernel/exit.c:892: tsk->flags |= PF_POSTCOREDUMP;
kernel/exit.c-893- core_state = signal->core_state;
--
kernel/fork.c=2029=__latent_entropy struct task_struct *copy_process(
--
kernel/fork.c-2160- goto bad_fork_free;
kernel/fork.c:2161: p->flags &= ~PF_KTHREAD;
kernel/fork.c-2162- if (args->kthread)
kernel/fork.c:2163: p->flags |= PF_KTHREAD;
kernel/fork.c-2164- if (args->user_worker) {
kernel/fork.c-2165- /* A user worker takes only the signals nobody can block. */
kernel/fork.c:2166: p->flags |= PF_USER_WORKER;
kernel/fork.c-2167- siginitsetinv(&p->blocked, SIG_KERNEL_ONLY_MASK);
--
kernel/fork.c-2169- if (args->io_thread)
kernel/fork.c:2170: p->flags |= PF_IO_WORKER;
kernel/fork.c-2171-
--
kernel/fork.c-2209- delayacct_tsk_init(p); /* Must remain after dup_task_struct() */
kernel/fork.c:2210: p->flags &= ~(PF_SUPERPRIV | PF_WQ_WORKER | PF_IDLE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY);
kernel/fork.c:2211: p->flags |= PF_FORKNOEXEC;
kernel/fork.c-2212- INIT_LIST_HEAD(&p->children);
--
kernel/fork.c-2380- p->plug = NULL;
kernel/fork.c:2381: p->flags &= ~PF_BLOCK_TS;
kernel/fork.c-2382-#endif
--
kernel/kthread.c=566=static void __kthread_bind_mask(struct task_struct *p, const struct cpumask *mask, unsigned int state)
--
kernel/kthread.c-576- /* It's safe because the task is inactive. */
kernel/kthread.c:577: p->flags |= PF_NO_SETAFFINITY;
kernel/kthread.c-578-}
--
kernel/sched/cputime.c=960=void vtime_guest_enter(struct task_struct *tsk)
--
kernel/sched/cputime.c-971- vtime_account_system(tsk, vtime);
kernel/sched/cputime.c:972: tsk->flags |= PF_VCPU;
kernel/sched/cputime.c-973- vtime->state = VTIME_GUEST;
--
kernel/sched/cputime.c=978=void vtime_guest_exit(struct task_struct *tsk)
--
kernel/sched/cputime.c-983- vtime_account_guest(tsk, vtime);
kernel/sched/cputime.c:984: tsk->flags &= ~PF_VCPU;
kernel/sched/cputime.c-985- vtime->state = VTIME_SYS;
--
kernel/sched/topology.c=760=cpu_attach_domain(struct sched_domain *sd, struct root_domain *rd, int cpu)
--
kernel/sched/topology.c-798- if (parent->flags & SD_PREFER_SIBLING)
kernel/sched/topology.c:799: tmp->flags |= SD_PREFER_SIBLING;
kernel/sched/topology.c-800- destroy_sched_domain(parent);
]
|
| 47/2 |
2026/11/18 05:31 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 61623
output: 38
thoughts: 1922
Thoughts: **Analysis of a Potential KCSAN Report: A Deep Dive into Task Flags and Synchronization**
Okay, so I'm looking at this KCSAN report, and my initial thought is that it's focusing on an interesting situation: the read of `current->flags` in `posixtimer_get_target` and the potential concurrency with its modification. What I see is that the modification of `flags` seems highly constrained. The only places that modify a task's own `flags` are the task itself, except for task creation, and during `vtime_guest_enter/exit` and `synchronize_group_exit` where `tsk` is `current`. There's no concurrent write from another CPU or an interrupt handler, just a single writer (current) modifying its own `task_struct::flags`.
The KCSAN report highlights a read within an interrupt handler (potentially on the *same* CPU as the task being interrupted) during `posixtimer_send_sigqueue`. Specifically, the code in `posixtimer_get_target` is key:
I'm thinking, "can `posixtimer_get_target` ever be called on another CPU and read `current->flags`?" The answer is no, because `current` refers to the task running on *that* CPU. So this read is always of the current task's flags on the CPU executing the code. And even if an interrupt happens, the interrupted task's flags are being read.
Then the code moves to `task_can_queue_signal`. This code reads `t->flags`, protected by `&t->sighand->siglock`, and `exit_signals` writes `tsk->flags |= PF_EXITING;` also protected by the same lock. So the code correctly handles a race where the target task might be exiting.
In `posixtimer_get_target`, the reason for reading `current->flags` is to optimize the signal delivery, so the current task can be a signal target and avoid waking up another thread. The code checks `current->flags & PF_EXITING`. If true, the code doesn't make `t = current`. If not exiting, the code chooses the current task. Later in `posixtimer_send_sigqueue` the code re-checks `t->flags & PF_EXITING` using `task_can_queue_signal` under the sighand lock!
Now, the entire sequence in `posixtimer_send_sigqueue` is clear:
1. `t = posixtimer_get_target(tmr);`: Heuristic check, potentially choosing `current` if it belongs to the same thread group and isn't exiting.
2. `lock_task_sighand(t, &flags);`: Locks `t->sighand->siglock`.
3. `if (!task_can_queue_signal(t, tmr->it_pid_type)) goto unlock;`: Re-checks `t->flags & PF_EXITING` under the lock!
This is classic "Marked Reloads & Lock Re-checks / Heuristic Hints": The unlocked check in `posixtimer_get_target` is a fast path, but then `lock_task_sighand` and `task_can_queue_signal` re-verify. `current->flags` is an aligned 32-bit scalar. The writer is `current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV;` in `ns_capable_common()` (a single writer, updating its own flags), and the reader checks `current->flags & PF_EXITING`. The bits `PF_SUPERPRIV` (0x100) and `PF_EXITING` (0x04) are different, so a torn read is not even possible, and even a stale read is safe.
Even if there's a stale or torn value (which is highly unlikely due to atomic 32-bit accesses), observing `PF_EXITING` as 0 or 1 is safe. If it's 1 (exiting), it skips the optimization and safely delivers the signal to a potentially different target. If it's 0 (not exiting), it uses
|
| 48/2 |
2026/11/18 05:31 |
tool |
git-log |
0m
Args: map[CodeRegexp:posixtimer_get_target Count:10 PathPrefix:kernel/]
Results: map[Output:d2710c8d938a signal: Prevent exec() race
caf77435dd8a signal: Handle ignored signals in do_sigaction(action != SIG_IGN)
0360ed14d982 signal: Refactor send_sigqueue()
]
|
| 49/2 |
2026/11/18 05:32 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 64569
output: 36
thoughts: 47
Thoughts: Okay, here's my assessment of the situation:
**Investigating the Usage of `READ_ONCE` with `PF_EXITING`**
Alright, I need to quickly assess the usage of `READ_ONCE` in conjunction with `PF_EXITING`. My initial thought is to determine if this pattern is generally recommended or perhaps employed elsewhere within the codebase. I'll need to confirm that `READ_ONCE` is the preferred approach for accessing `current->flags` in the context of `PF_EXITING`.
Therefore, I'll initiate a grep search. Specifically, I'll be looking for instances of `READ_ONCE` combined with `PF_EXITING`, or perhaps variations on that theme, to get a handle on its prevalence. This should quickly give me a sense of best practices, or if this is a localized, potentially isolated instance. I'm hoping to quickly identify established patterns or potential areas for improvement.
|
| 50/2 |
2026/11/18 05:32 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:READ_ONCE\([^)]*flags\).*PF_ PathPrefixes:[kernel/]]
Results: map[Output:kernel/kthread.c=82=static inline struct kthread *to_kthread(struct task_struct *k)
kernel/kthread.c-83-{
kernel/kthread.c:84: WARN_ON(!(READ_ONCE(k->flags) & PF_KTHREAD));
kernel/kthread.c-85- return k->worker_private;
]
|
| 51/2 |
2026/11/18 05:32 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 64954
output: 35
thoughts: 13
Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience:
**Analyzing Potential Data Races on the `flags` Variable**
Alright, let's get down to brass tacks. My initial thought process is pretty straightforward: I need to investigate the potential for data races, specifically focusing on the `flags` variable. I'm operating under the assumption that `flags` is a shared resource, likely accessed and modified by multiple threads or processes within this system. I need to understand its synchronization characteristics, or lack thereof. Is it protected by a mutex, a semaphore, atomic operations, or is it completely unguarded? The potential for a race condition hinges entirely on how that variable is being handled. This is critical because any concurrency issues here could lead to undefined behavior, corrupted data, or even program crashes. Time to dig in!
|
| 52/2 |
2026/11/18 05:32 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:data_race\([^)]*flags\s*& PathPrefixes:[kernel/]]
Results:
|
| 53/2 |
2026/11/18 05:32 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 65192
output: 29
thoughts: 17
Thoughts: Here's my take on those thoughts:
**Investigating `PF_EXITING` Usage**
Alright, let's get down to brass tacks. I need to understand the implications of the `PF_EXITING` flag. To do this properly, I'm going to track down every instance where that flag is checked within the codebase. I need to build a comprehensive map of how it's used and, critically, how those checks influence the execution flow. Understanding the *context* of these checks is going to be paramount; I'm not just looking for where it *is*, but how it's *used*. This will allow me to identify potential areas of concern, optimization opportunities, or even subtle bugs related to process termination. Let's see what we can find.
|
| 54/2 |
2026/11/18 05:32 |
tool |
grepper |
0m
Args: map[Expression:flags & PF_EXITING PathPrefixes:[kernel/]]
Results: map[Output:
Full output is too long, showing 200 out of 252 lines.
Use more precise expression or PathPrefixes if possible.
Number of matching lines per file (23 files in total):
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:1
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:1
kernel/events/core.c:3
kernel/events/uprobes.c:1
kernel/exit.c:2
kernel/futex/pi.c:1
kernel/irq/handle.c:1
kernel/irq/manage.c:1
kernel/kthread.c:1
kernel/pid.c:2
kernel/ptrace.c:2
kernel/rseq.c:1
kernel/sched/autogroup.c:1
kernel/sched/ext/ext.c:1
kernel/sched/ext/idle.c:1
kernel/sched/fair.c:5
kernel/seccomp.c:3
kernel/signal.c:5
kernel/task_work.c:1
kernel/time/posix-cpu-timers.c:3
kernel/trace/trace_uprobe.c:1
kernel/tsacct.c:1
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c=104=int cgroup_transfer_tasks(struct cgroup *to, struct cgroup *from)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-141- task = css_task_iter_next(&it);
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c:142: } while (task && (task->flags & PF_EXITING));
kernel/cgroup/cgroup-v1.c-143-
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=882=static void css_set_move_task(struct task_struct *task,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-908- */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:909: WARN_ON_ONCE(task->flags & PF_EXITING);
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-910-
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=2596=static void cgroup_migrate_add_task(struct task_struct *task,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2603- /* @task either already exited or can't exit until the end */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:2604: if (task->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-2605- return;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=5203=static void css_task_iter_advance(struct css_task_iter *it)
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5244- if (!(it->flags & CSS_TASK_ITER_WITH_DEAD) &&
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:5245: (task->flags & PF_EXITING) && !atomic_read(&task->signal->live))
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-5246- goto repeat;
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c=6758=int proc_cgroup_show(struct seq_file *m, struct pid_namespace *ns,
--
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-6804- */
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:6805: if (cgroup_on_dfl(cgrp) || !(tsk->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c-6806- retval = cgroup_path_ns_locked(cgrp, buf, PATH_MAX,
--
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c=4457=bool cpuset_current_node_allowed(int node, gfp_t gfp_mask)
--
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c-4472- return true;
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c:4473: if (current->flags & PF_EXITING) /* Let dying task have memory */
kernel/cgroup/cpuset.c-4474- return true;
--
kernel/events/core.c=5127=find_get_context(struct task_struct *task, struct perf_event *event)
--
kernel/events/core.c-5172- */
kernel/events/core.c:5173: if (task->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/events/core.c-5174- err = -ESRCH;
--
kernel/events/core.c=5446=attach_task_ctx_data(struct task_struct *task, struct kmem_cache *ctx_cache,
--
kernel/events/core.c-5467- */
kernel/events/core.c:5468: if (task->flags & PF_EXITING) {
kernel/events/core.c-5469- /* detach_task_ctx_data() may free it already */
--
kernel/events/core.c=5504=attach_global_ctx_data(struct kmem_cache *ctx_cache)
--
kernel/events/core.c-5519- for_each_process_thread(g, p) {
kernel/events/core.c:5520: if (p->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/events/core.c-5521- continue;
--
kernel/events/uprobes.c=2167=static void dup_xol_work(struct callback_head *work)
kernel/events/uprobes.c-2168-{
kernel/events/uprobes.c:2169: if (current->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/events/uprobes.c-2170- return;
--
kernel/exit.c=591=static struct task_struct *find_alive_thread(struct task_struct *p)
--
kernel/exit.c-595- for_each_thread(p, t) {
kernel/exit.c:596: if (!(t->flags & PF_EXITING))
kernel/exit.c-597- return t;
--
kernel/exit.c=1027=void __noreturn make_task_dead(int signr)
--
kernel/exit.c-1075- */
kernel/exit.c:1076: if (unlikely(tsk->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
kernel/exit.c-1077- pr_alert("Fixing recursive fault but reboot is needed!\n");
--
kernel/futex/pi.c=373=static int handle_exit_race(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 uval)
--
kernel/futex/pi.c-390- * *uaddr = 0xC0000000; tsk = get_task(PID);
kernel/futex/pi.c:391: * } if (!tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) {
kernel/futex/pi.c-392- * ... attach();
--
kernel/irq/handle.c=61=void __irq_wake_thread(struct irq_desc *desc, struct irqaction *action)
--
kernel/irq/handle.c-67- */
kernel/irq/handle.c:68: if (action->thread->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/irq/handle.c-69- return;
--
kernel/irq/manage.c=1180=static void __irq_thread_dtor(struct irqaction *action)
--
kernel/irq/manage.c-1184-
kernel/irq/manage.c:1185: if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)))
kernel/irq/manage.c-1186- return;
--
kernel/kthread.c=703=int kthread_park(struct task_struct *k)
--
kernel/kthread.c-706-
kernel/kthread.c:707: if (WARN_ON(k->flags & PF_EXITING))
kernel/kthread.c-708- return -ENOSYS;
--
kernel/pid.c=850=static struct file *__pidfd_fget(struct task_struct *task, int fd)
--
kernel/pid.c-860- file = ERR_PTR(-EPERM);
kernel/pid.c:861: else if (task->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/pid.c-862- file = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
--
kernel/pid.c-880- */
kernel/pid.c:881: if (task->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/pid.c-882- file = ERR_PTR(-ESRCH);
--
kernel/ptrace.c=135=void __ptrace_unlink(struct task_struct *child)
--
kernel/ptrace.c-163- */
kernel/ptrace.c:164: if (!(child->flags & PF_EXITING) &&
kernel/ptrace.c-165- (child->signal->flags & SIGNAL_STOP_STOPPED ||
--
kernel/ptrace.c=512=static int ptrace_traceme(void)
--
kernel/ptrace.c-524- */
kernel/ptrace.c:525: if (!ret && !(current->real_parent->flags & PF_EXITING)) {
kernel/ptrace.c-526- current->ptrace = PT_PTRACED;
--
kernel/rseq.c=253=static void rseq_slowpath_update_usr(struct pt_regs *regs)
--
kernel/rseq.c-267-
kernel/rseq.c:268: if (unlikely(t->flags & PF_EXITING))
kernel/rseq.c-269- return;
--
kernel/sched/autogroup.c=131=bool task_wants_autogroup(struct task_struct *p, struct task_group *tg)
--
kernel/sched/autogroup.c-142- */
kernel/sched/autogroup.c:143: if (p->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/sched/autogroup.c-144- return false;
--
kernel/sched/ext/ext.c=2247=void scx_do_enqueue_task(struct rq *rq, struct task_struct *p, u64 enq_flags,
--
kernel/sched/ext/ext.c-2324- /* see %SCX_OPS_ENQ_EXITING */
kernel/sched/ext/ext.c:2325: if (unlikely(p->flags & PF_EXITING) &&
kernel/sched/ext/ext.c-2326- !(sch->ops.flags & SCX_OPS_ENQ_EXITING)) {
--
kernel/sched/ext/idle.c=468=s32 scx_select_cpu_dfl(struct task_struct *p, s32 prev_cpu, u64 wake_flags,
--
kernel/sched/ext/idle.c-563- waker_node = scx_cpu_node_if_enabled(cpu);
kernel/sched/ext/idle.c:564: if (!(current->flags & PF_EXITING) &&
kernel/sched/ext/idle.c-565- cpu_rq(cpu)->scx.local_dsq.nr == 0 &&
--
kernel/sched/fair.c=1990=static void task_cache_work(struct callback_head *work)
--
kernel/sched/fair.c-2003-
kernel/sched/fair.c:2004: if (p->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/sched/fair.c-2005- return;
--
kernel/sched/fair.c=4278=static void task_numa_work(struct callback_head *work)
--
kernel/sched/fair.c-4302- */
kernel/sched/fair.c:4303: if (p->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/sched/fair.c-4304- return;
--
kernel/sched/fair.c=4615=static void update_scan_period(struct task_struct *p, int new_cpu)
--
kernel/sched/fair.c-4622-
kernel/sched/fair.c:4623: if (!p->mm || !p->numa_faults || (p->flags & PF_EXITING))
kernel/sched/fair.c-4624- return;
--
kernel/sched/fair.c=6906=static void throttle_cfs_rq_work(struct callback_head *work)
--
kernel/sched/fair.c-6919- */
kernel/sched/fair.c:6920: if ((p->flags & PF_EXITING))
kernel/sched/fair.c-6921- return;
--
kernel/sched/fair.c=9920=select_task_rq_fair(struct task_struct *p, int prev_cpu, int wake_flags)
kernel/sched/fair.c-9921-{
kernel/sched/fair.c:9922: int sync = (wake_flags & WF_SYNC) && !(current->flags & PF_EXITING);
kernel/sched/fair.c-9923- struct sched_domain *tmp, *sd = NULL;
--
kernel/seccomp.c=490=static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void)
--
kernel/seccomp.c-505- /* Skip exited threads. */
kernel/seccomp.c:506: if (thread->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/seccomp.c-507- continue;
--
kernel/seccomp.c=572=void seccomp_filter_release(struct task_struct *tsk)
--
kernel/seccomp.c-575-
kernel/seccomp.c:576: if (WARN_ON((tsk->flags & PF_EXITING) == 0))
kernel/seccomp.c-577- return;
--
kernel/seccomp.c=600=static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags)
--
kernel/seccomp.c-624- */
kernel/seccomp.c:625: if (thread->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/seccomp.c-626- continue;
--
kernel/signal.c=262=bool task_set_jobctl_pending(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long mask)
--
kernel/signal.c-267-
kernel/signal.c:268: if (unlikely(fatal_signal_pending(task) || (task->flags & PF_EXITING)))
kernel/signal.c-269- return false;
--
kernel/signal.c=953=static inline bool wants_signal(int sig, struct task_struct *p)
--
kernel/signal.c-957-
kernel/signal.c:958: if (p->flags & PF_EXITING)
kernel/signal.c-959- return false;
--
]
|
| 55/2 |
2026/11/18 05:32 |
llm |
expert |
1m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 69298
output: 15
thoughts: 966
Thoughts: **Analyzing the Lockless Read of PF_EXITING**
Okay, here's what I'm seeing. This `PF_EXITING` flag in the task structure is being read locklessly all over the kernel as a quick check, almost like a fast-path optimization or a hint. I'm seeing it in `select_task_rq_fair`, `cpuset_current_node_allowed`, `dup_xol_work`, `task_set_jobctl_pending`, `wants_signal`, and in `posixtimer_get_target`. And interestingly, the `PF_SUPERPRIV` flag is being set with a lockless write in `ns_capable_common()`.
Now, let's break this down based on the protocol classifications.
* **Heuristic Hints:** Looking at `posixtimer_get_target()` specifically, `!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)` is being used to *prefer* `current` if it's in the same thread group, saving a wakeup. If this read is stale or inaccurate, it's totally safe; we just fall back to another target (`t`). A classic heuristic hint.
* **Single-Writer Flag Updates:** The task itself is the only writer modifying its own flags. The concurrent reads are simple bitwise checks. This is the single-writer pattern we tolerate.
* **Lock Re-checks:** In `posixtimer_get_target()`, even if the lockless read is stale and we choose `current`, the code then acquires `lock_task_sighand()` and re-checks the exit condition under the protection of `sighand->siglock`.
* **Safe Plain Scalar Accesses:** The `flags` field is a 32-bit aligned scalar integer. There's no way a tearing read or write can occur. Furthermore, setting `PF_SUPERPRIV` is unrelated to `PF_EXITING`; they are independent flags.
Given all of this, is there *any* potential for memory corruption, use-after-free, a kernel crash, a hang, a warning, a semantic bug, or an ABI violation? No, definitely not.
This looks unequivocally **BENIGN**. It's safe to proceed.
I will call the `set-results` tool now.
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| 56/2 |
2026/11/18 05:34 |
tool |
set-results |
0m
Args:
Results: map[Benign:true FailureDetectableBy:]
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| 57/2 |
2026/11/18 05:34 |
llm |
expert |
0m
Model:
Tokens:
input: 70793
output: 738
thoughts: 627
Thoughts: **Analyzing the 'set-results' Output**
Okay, so `set-results` is done, and it's time to put together the final report. Here's how I see it:
* **Race Summary:** It's a race between `ns_capable_common()` (through `capable()`) and `posixtimer_get_target()` (from `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()`) on the `current->flags` field of `task_struct`.
* **Synchronization Context:** Task 12250, running in process context (specifically `sys_acct` calling `capable`), modifies its own `current->flags` without any locking or interrupt disabling. Simultaneously, a local APIC timer interrupt on the same CPU (CPU 0) triggers `posix_timer_fn`, leading to `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` calling `posixtimer_get_target()`. The latter *locklessly* reads `current->flags` to check the `PF_EXITING` bit.
* **Final Classification:** This one's benign.
* **Reasoning:**
1. The `!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)` check in `posixtimer_get_target()` is just a quick optimization. It's a heuristic to avoid waking up an idle thread. If that check is false, signal delivery safely falls back to the intended target.
2. `ns_capable_common()` writes `PF_SUPERPRIV` (bit 0x00000100) to `current->flags`, while `posixtimer_get_target()` only reads `PF_EXITING` (bit 0x00000004). The write operation does not have any effect on the state of the read operation's bit.
3. Even if the interrupted task (i.e. `current`) is selected, `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` *immediately* acquires `sighand->siglock` and validates `task_can_queue_signal(t, tmr->it_pid_type)` under the lock. Signal queuing is ultimately synchronized.
4. `current->flags` is a 32-bit aligned integer, and scalar 32-bit aligned reads and writes are atomic on modern architectures, so we don't have to worry about data tearing.
* **Recommended Annotations:** To be absolutely safe, I'd suggest wrapping the read in `READ_ONCE(current->flags)` or using `data_race()` in `posixtimer_get_target()` just to be on the safe side, even if it's unlikely to cause any issues.
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| 58/1 |
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action |
format-explanation |
0m
Results: map[Explanation:### Race Summary
`ns_capable_common()` vs `posixtimer_get_target()` (inlined in
`posixtimer_send_sigqueue()`) on `current->flags` (`task_struct::flags`).
---
### Synchronization Context
Task 12250 running on CPU 0 in process context (`sys_acct` -> `capable()` ->
`ns_capable_common()`) updates its own process flags (`current->flags |=
PF_SUPERPRIV`) with local interrupts enabled and without holding a lock. While
executing this access, a local APIC timer interrupt fires on CPU 0. In hardirq
context, `posix_timer_fn()` invokes `posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` ->
`posixtimer_get_target()`, which performs an unlocked check on the interrupted
task's flags (`current->flags & PF_EXITING`).
---
### Final Classification
**BENIGN**
---
### Reasoning
This data race is benign for the following reasons:
1. **Heuristic Hint:** The check `same_thread_group(t, current) &&
!(current->flags & PF_EXITING)` in `posixtimer_get_target()` is a heuristic
fast-path optimization. For non-PID-targeted timer signals, it prefers directing
signal delivery to the currently running task if it is part of the same process
group to avoid waking up an idle thread. If this check evaluates to false (or
sees an old value), signal delivery safely falls back to `t` (the group
leader/target task).
2. **Disjoint Flag Bits:** `ns_capable_common()` updates `PF_SUPERPRIV`
(`0x00000100`), whereas `posixtimer_get_target()` exclusively masks and tests
`PF_EXITING` (`0x00000004`). The bitwise OR operation in `ns_capable_common()`
does not affect the `PF_EXITING` bit.
3. **Lock Re-check:** If `current` is chosen as the delivery target,
`posixtimer_send_sigqueue()` immediately calls `lock_task_sighand(t, &flags)` to
acquire `t->sighand->siglock` and then re-verifies `task_can_queue_signal(t,
tmr->it_pid_type)` under the lock before enqueueing any signal.
4. **Naturally Aligned Word-Sized Access:** `task_struct::flags` is a naturally
aligned 32-bit unsigned integer (`unsigned int`). 32-bit aligned scalar memory
accesses are atomic with respect to interrupts and will not tear.
---
### Recommended Annotations
To silence KCSAN warnings on the lockless check, annotate the read in
`posixtimer_get_target()`:
```c
static inline struct task_struct *posixtimer_get_target(struct k_itimer *tmr)
{
struct task_struct *t = pid_task(tmr->it_pid, tmr->it_pid_type);
if (t && tmr->it_pid_type != PIDTYPE_PID &&
same_thread_group(t, current) && !(READ_ONCE(current->flags) &
PF_EXITING))
t = current;
return t;
}
```]
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