syzbot
general protection fault in step_into_slowpath
Status:
upstream: reported C repro on 2026/11/15 21:57
Subsystems:
squashfs
Labels:
prio:normal
[Documentation on labels]
Reported-by: syzbot+d393ed2b27449be4992b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
First crash: 2h04m, last: 23m
✨ AI-generated root cause summary:
In squashfs_lookup() (fs/squashfs/namei.c), the local variable int err is declared uninitialized and receives a positive return value (number of bytes read) from preceding successful calls to squashfs_read_metadata(). When directory boundary checks via squashfs_dir_space() fail, execution jumps directly to the read_failure label rather than data_error (which sets err = -EIO). Consequently, squashfs_lookup() returns ERR_PTR(err) holding a small positive integer (e.g., (struct dentry *)0x6) or uninitialized stack data, which VFS path resolution treats as a valid dentry pointer and subsequently dereferences at offset 0 (d_flags) in traverse_mounts(), causing a kernel crash.
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✨ Full AI root cause analysis
Root Cause Analysis
1. Relevant Subsystems, Functions, and Files
- Faulty logic location:
fs/squashfs/namei.c in function squashfs_lookup()
- Underlying helper:
fs/squashfs/cache.c in function squashfs_read_metadata()
- VFS manifestation path:
fs/namei.c in functions finish_lookup(), walk_component(), step_into(), step_into_slowpath(), handle_mounts(), and traverse_mounts()
2. Root Cause Mechanism and Triggering Chain
In squashfs_lookup() (fs/squashfs/namei.c):
-
Uninitialized variable and positive assignment:
The local variable int err; is declared at line 175 without initialization:
int err;
During directory entry lookup, metadata reads are performed by calling squashfs_read_metadata() (fs/squashfs/cache.c:438):
err = squashfs_read_metadata(dir->i_sb, &dirh, &block, &offset, sizeof(dirh));
...
err = squashfs_read_metadata(dir->i_sb, dire, &block, &offset, sizeof(*dire));
...
err = squashfs_read_metadata(dir->i_sb, dire->name, &block, &offset, size);
On success, squashfs_read_metadata() returns res = length, which is a positive integer (the number of bytes successfully read). Hence, after reading an entry name of length 6, err holds 6.
-
Improper error jump on bounds check failure:
Before reading directory headers and directory entries, boundary checks against inode size are performed via squashfs_dir_space(dir, length, ...) (fs/squashfs/namei.c:205, 224, 239).
If a directory has a corrupted or truncated i_size such that squashfs_dir_space() returns false, the code executes:
if (!squashfs_dir_space(dir, length, sizeof(*dire)))
goto read_failure;
Notice that it jumps directly to read_failure:, completely bypassing data_error:, which is the label responsible for setting err = -EIO;:
data_error:
err = -EIO;
read_failure:
ERROR("Unable to read directory block [%llx:%x]\n",
squashfs_i(dir)->start, squashfs_i(dir)->offset);
failed:
kfree(dire);
return ERR_PTR(err);
Consequently:
- If
squashfs_dir_space() fails after one or more successful reads, err contains the positive byte count returned by squashfs_read_metadata() (e.g., err = 6).
- If
squashfs_dir_space() fails on line 205 prior to any squashfs_read_metadata() invocation, err contains whatever garbage was on the stack.
-
VFS pointer confusion and crash propagation:
squashfs_lookup() returns ERR_PTR(err). Because err == 6, ERR_PTR(6) evaluates to (struct dentry *)0x0000000000000006.
- In
finish_lookup() (fs/namei.c:1936):
res = dir->i_op->lookup(dir, dentry, flags);
d_lookup_done(dentry);
if (unlikely(res)) {
dput(dentry);
return res;
}
res is non-NULL (0x6), so finish_lookup() drops the allocated dentry and returns (struct dentry *)0x6.
- In
walk_component() (fs/namei.c:2326):
dentry = lookup_slow(&nd->last, nd->path.dentry, nd->flags);
if (IS_ERR(dentry))
return ERR_CAST(dentry);
...
return step_into(nd, flags, dentry);
IS_ERR(0x6) evaluates to false because 0x6 is not within [-4095, -1]. walk_component() assumes 0x6 is a valid struct dentry * and passes it to step_into().
step_into() invokes step_into_slowpath() -> handle_mounts() -> traverse_mounts() (fs/namei.c:1665):
unsigned flags = smp_load_acquire(&path->dentry->d_flags);
Offset 0 of struct dentry is d_flags. KASAN checks the shadow address for 0x6:
(0x6 >> 3) + 0xdffffc0000000000 = 0xdffffc0000000000.
Because 0xdffffc0000000000 is non-canonical on x86_64, the CPU triggers a general protection fault (#GP), reported by KASAN as a null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007].
Sample crash report:
loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 8
SQUASHFS error: Unable to read directory block [0:26]
Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007]
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 5644 Comm: syz-executor134 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/06/2026
RIP: 0010:traverse_mounts fs/namei.c:1665 [inline]
RIP: 0010:handle_mounts fs/namei.c:1777 [inline]
RIP: 0010:step_into_slowpath+0x112/0x810 fs/namei.c:2146
Code: 24 1f 00 49 bf 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 43 0f b6 04 3c 84 c0 0f 85 75 05 00 00 45 8b 75 00 4c 8b 6c 24 48 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 76 05 00 00 45 8b 6d 00 44 89 ee 81 e6
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ba7a40 EFLAGS: 00010247
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90003ba7c20 RCX: ffff888037d43e80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003ba7af0 R08: ffff888078fd331f R09: 1ffff1100f1fa663
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f1fa664 R12: 1ffff92000774f8b
R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000555564c07400(0000) GS:ffff8881234cd000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fff34166e74 CR3: 000000007b074000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
step_into fs/namei.c:2194 [inline]
walk_component fs/namei.c:2331 [inline]
lookup_last fs/namei.c:2839 [inline]
path_lookupat+0x433/0x8c0 fs/namei.c:2864
filename_lookup+0x265/0x5d0 fs/namei.c:2893
user_path_at+0x40/0x160 fs/namei.c:3692
do_mount fs/namespace.c:4467 [inline]
__do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4683 [inline]
__se_sys_mount+0x2dc/0x420 fs/namespace.c:4660
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x171/0x540 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x00007fdbf37e4949
Code: c0 79 93 eb d5 48 8d 7c 1d 00 eb 99 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 d8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fff0f8baee8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000a5
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000200000000000 RCX: 00007fdbf37e4949
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00002000000000c0 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: 0000000000000001 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000004000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007fff0f8baf20
R13: 0000000000000002 R14: 431bde82d7b634db R15: 00007fdbf384404b
</TASK>
Modules linked in:
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
RIP: 0010:traverse_mounts fs/namei.c:1665 [inline]
RIP: 0010:handle_mounts fs/namei.c:1777 [inline]
RIP: 0010:step_into_slowpath+0x112/0x810 fs/namei.c:2146
Code: 24 1f 00 49 bf 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 43 0f b6 04 3c 84 c0 0f 85 75 05 00 00 45 8b 75 00 4c 8b 6c 24 48 4c 89 e8 48 c1 e8 03 <42> 0f b6 04 38 84 c0 0f 85 76 05 00 00 45 8b 6d 00 44 89 ee 81 e6
RSP: 0018:ffffc90003ba7a40 EFLAGS: 00010247
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffc90003ba7c20 RCX: ffff888037d43e80
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
RBP: ffffc90003ba7af0 R08: ffff888078fd331f R09: 1ffff1100f1fa663
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed100f1fa664 R12: 1ffff92000774f8b
R13: 0000000000000006 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 0000555564c07400(0000) GS:ffff8881234cd000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007fff34166e74 CR3: 000000007b074000 CR4: 00000000003526f0
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess):
0: 24 1f and $0x1f,%al
2: 00 49 bf add %cl,-0x41(%rcx)
5: 00 00 add %al,(%rax)
7: 00 00 add %al,(%rax)
9: 00 fc add %bh,%ah
b: ff lcall (bad)
c: df 43 0f filds 0xf(%rbx)
f: b6 04 mov $0x4,%dh
11: 3c 84 cmp $0x84,%al
13: c0 0f 85 rorb $0x85,(%rdi)
16: 75 05 jne 0x1d
18: 00 00 add %al,(%rax)
1a: 45 8b 75 00 mov 0x0(%r13),%r14d
1e: 4c 8b 6c 24 48 mov 0x48(%rsp),%r13
23: 4c 89 e8 mov %r13,%rax
26: 48 c1 e8 03 shr $0x3,%rax
* 2a: 42 0f b6 04 38 movzbl (%rax,%r15,1),%eax <-- trapping instruction
2f: 84 c0 test %al,%al
31: 0f 85 76 05 00 00 jne 0x5ad
37: 45 8b 6d 00 mov 0x0(%r13),%r13d
3b: 44 89 ee mov %r13d,%esi
3e: 81 .byte 0x81
3f: e6 .byte 0xe6
* Struck through repros no longer work on HEAD.