KCSAN: data-race in ioctl_has_perm / selinux_inode_post_setxattr

Status: moderation: reported on 2026/11/18 00:01
Subsystems: selinux
Labels: prio:low race:benign
[Documentation on labels]
Reported-by: syzbot+8619c7745c88e275aab7@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
First crash: 19h13m, last: 19h13m
✨ AI cause bisection: candidate commits (most relevant first) (AI job):
  aa9c2669626c NFS: Client implementation of Labeled-NFS
  fa1aa143ac4a selinux: extended permissions for ioctls
  
✨ AI-generated root cause summary:

A KCSAN data race occurs between selinux_inode_post_setxattr() and permission checks such as ioctl_has_perm(). SELinux permission checks read isec->sclass and isec->sid locklessly on the VFS fast path without READ_ONCE() once isec->initialized is set to LABEL_INITIALIZED. Concurrently, selinux_inode_post_setxattr() performs plain stores to isec->sclass and isec->sid under isec->lock. Because the inode's file mode type (S_IFMT) is immutable across the inode's lifetime and isec is already initialized via backing_inode_security(), the plain store to isec->sclass is redundant and unsynchronized with respect to concurrent lockless readers.

▶ ▼ ✨ Full AI root cause analysis
Based on kernel commit 666539eecdf4:

Root Cause Analysis

1. Functions, Structs, and Files Involved


2. Detailed Technical Mechanism

Synchronization Architecture in SELinux Inode Handling

In the SELinux security module, struct inode_security_struct (isec) tracks the security context and security class for each inode. The struct contains a spinlock (isec->lock). By design for VFS fast-path performance, this spinlock is only acquired when creating, revalidating, or modifying an inode's label (e.g., in inode_doinit_with_dentry(), selinux_inode_post_setxattr(), selinux_inode_setsecurity(), and selinux_task_to_inode()).

Standard permission checking fast pathsβ€”such as inode_has_perm(), inode_sid_has_perm(), selinux_inode_permission(), and ioctl_has_perm()β€”read isec->sid and isec->sclass without taking isec->lock once isec->initialized is set to LABEL_INITIALIZED. Specifically:

  • inode_security(inode) and backing_inode_security(dentry) perform an opportunistic lockless check:
    if (data_race(likely(isec->initialized == LABEL_INITIALIZED)))
        return isec;
    
  • After retrieving isec, ioctl_has_perm() reads isec->sid and isec->sclass directly:
    isec = inode_security(inode);
    rc = avc_has_extended_perms(ssid, isec->sid, isec->sclass, requested,
                                driver, AVC_EXT_IOCTL, xperm, &ad);
    
The Data Race Trigger

When userspace modifies the security.selinux extended attribute of an inode (via syscalls like setxattr or lsetxattr), selinux_inode_post_setxattr() is invoked:

isec = backing_inode_security(dentry);
spin_lock(&isec->lock);
isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode);
isec->sid = newsid;
isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED;
spin_unlock(&isec->lock);
  1. Unsynchronized Store vs. Lockless Reader: While selinux_inode_post_setxattr() takes spin_lock(&isec->lock), concurrent readers such as ioctl_has_perm() do not hold isec->lock. The write isec->sclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(inode->i_mode) is a plain C store without WRITE_ONCE(), and the read in ioctl_has_perm() is a plain C load without READ_ONCE(). This forms an unsynchronized concurrent read/write under the Linux Kernel Memory Model (LKMM), which KCSAN detects and reports.

  2. Redundant Store to isec->sclass: backing_inode_security(dentry) at line 3527 has already ensured that isec was initialized (setting isec->sclass via inode_doinit_with_dentry()). Under POSIX and Linux VFS semantics, an inode's file mode type (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT) is immutable for the lifetime of the inode; updating an extended attribute cannot transform a regular file into a directory, socket, or device node. Therefore, rewriting isec->sclass in selinux_inode_post_setxattr() writes the exact value that isec->sclass already holds. Performing this plain write against live inodes unnecessarily exposes concurrent readers to a data race.

▶ ▼ ✨ AI Jobs (3)
ID Workflow Result Correct Bug Created Started Finished Revision
a3923bff assessment-kcsan Benign: βœ… ❓ KCSAN: data-race in ioctl_has_perm / selinux_inode_post_setxattr 2026/11/17 21:11 2026/11/17 21:11 2026/11/17 21:33 ca622473
045de0ba bisect-cause ❓ KCSAN: data-race in ioctl_has_perm / selinux_inode_post_setxattr 2026/11/17 21:06 2026/11/17 21:06 2026/11/17 21:17 ca622473
7faee2ee assessment-security DenialOfService: ❌ Exploitable: ❌ FilesystemTrigger: ❌ FuzzingArtifact: ❌ MemoryCorruption: ❌ NetworkNeedsSetup: ❌ NetworkTrigger: ❌ PeripheralTrigger: ❌ RemoteTrigger: ❌ Unprivileged: βœ… UserNamespace: βœ… VMGuestTrigger: ❌ VMHostTrigger: ❌ ❓ KCSAN: data-race in ioctl_has_perm / selinux_inode_post_setxattr 2026/11/17 21:05 2026/11/17 21:05 2026/11/17 21:11 ca622473

Sample crash report:
==================================================================
BUG: KCSAN: data-race in ioctl_has_perm / selinux_inode_post_setxattr

write to 0xffff88813aeac998 of 2 bytes by task 29095 on cpu 0:
 selinux_inode_post_setxattr+0x205/0x2b0 security/selinux/hooks.c:3529
 security_inode_post_setxattr+0x90/0xb0 security/security.c:2075
 __vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x39c/0x420 fs/xattr.c:261
 __vfs_setxattr_locked+0x105/0x240 fs/xattr.c:318
 vfs_setxattr+0x111/0x2b0 fs/xattr.c:344
 do_setxattr fs/xattr.c:662 [inline]
 filename_setxattr+0x1c4/0x410 fs/xattr.c:690
 path_setxattrat+0x2c1/0x320 fs/xattr.c:734
 __do_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:775 [inline]
 __se_sys_lsetxattr fs/xattr.c:771 [inline]
 __x64_sys_lsetxattr+0x71/0x90 fs/xattr.c:771
 x64_sys_call+0x22c1/0x2550 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:190
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x11e/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

read to 0xffff88813aeac998 of 2 bytes by task 2968 on cpu 1:
 ioctl_has_perm+0x244/0x2c0 security/selinux/hooks.c:3968
 selinux_file_ioctl+0x333/0x3b0 security/selinux/hooks.c:-1
 security_file_ioctl+0x44/0x80 security/security.c:2534
 __do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:592 [inline]
 __se_sys_ioctl+0x47/0x140 fs/ioctl.c:584
 __x64_sys_ioctl+0x43/0x50 fs/ioctl.c:584
 x64_sys_call+0x239d/0x2550 arch/x86/include/generated/asm/syscalls_64.h:17
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0x11e/0x3a0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:89
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 2968 Comm: acpid Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(lazy) 
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 11/06/2026
==================================================================

Crashes (1):
Time Kernel Commit Syzkaller Config Log Report Syz repro C repro VM info Assets (help?) Manager Title
2026/11/17 05:39 upstream 666539eecdf4 a3e64cfc .config console log report info [disk image] [vmlinux] [kernel image] ci2-upstream-kcsan-gce KCSAN: data-race in ioctl_has_perm / selinux_inode_post_setxattr
* Struck through repros no longer work on HEAD.